Campaign for freedom: the civil rights mvoement in Mobile, Alabama, 1942-1963 by Broughton, Timothy M. (Author) & Crawford, Vicki L. (Degree supervisor)
ABSTRACT
HISTORY
BROUGHTON, TIMOTHY M. B.S. SPRING HILL COLLEGE, 1986
M. DIV. INTERDENOMINATIONAL
THEOLOGICAL CENTER, 1994
CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN MOBILE, ALABAMA, 1942-1963
Advisor: Professor Vicki L. Crawford
Thesis dated May 2003
This dissertation examines Mobile’s modem civil rights movement between 1942
and 1963, by exploring the African-American commvmity’s stmggle for social equality
through the NAACP and grassroots organizations, including the Negro Veterans and
Voter’s League (NVVL), and Non-Voters Partisan League (NVPL). In addition, this
study documents the impact of the unique success of the Mobile African-American civil
rights movement on regional aind national movements.
This study was based on the premise that during the height of the protest for
social equality, African Americans in Mobile accomplished more in the stmggle for civil
rights than other major cities in Alabama. Also, although the Mobile community
suffered turmoil during its civil rights movement, it never reached the scale of that of
many southern cities.
The research found that Mobile blacks were prominent in politics, abolishing the
Alabama Democratic primary that had disenfranchised blacks since the Boswell
Amendment of the early 1900s. They also made noteworthy strides in economics and
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education. Blacks in Mobile were also the first to desegregate private and public
education in the state ofAlabama.
Scholars have tended to approach the civil rights movement from a national
perspective, often ignoring the experiences of the people whose lives were touched by the
struggle for equality on a daily basis. Therefore, the Mobile study relied not only upon
the traditional sources: newspapers and journals, manuscript collections, and government
documents. Personal interviews, letters, and telegrams written by local individuals and
organizations were used to delve into the lives of the activists.
The conclusions drawn from the findings suggest that the African-American
community in Mobile led one of the most successful civil rights movements in the South
and became one of the most identifiable instruments for social liberation in Alabama. A
tenacious leadership, a growing political maturity, and the ability to negotiate with city
leaders positioned the black community in Mobile to take a powerful stance against the
forces of social inequality.
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The black community’s most transformative period during the twentieth century
took place between the early 1940s and early 1960s. The first phase of the modem civil
tights movement came on the heels of World War H. The movement centered on such
reforms as the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board ofEducation ofTopeka,
the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955, and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which stands as one of the most important acts of legislation for the African-American
community since the abolition of slavery.*
During this period, the efforts of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE) aimed to eradicate of Jim Crow, the most visible manifestation of
institutionalized racism. Their agenda bovmd the hopes and expectations of thousands of
blacks, northern and southern, working- and middle-class, into a movement that sought
permanent political, social, and economic change.
These years witnessed the growing pains of oppressed communities reaching
unprecedented levels ofprotest and culminating in the age ofblack power and black pride
by the mid-1960s. After 1964, the radical black nationalists pushed the older generation
' James H. Cone, Martin. Malcolm and America (Maryknoll, New York; Orbis Book, 1991), 227;
Manning Marable, Race. Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America. 1945-
1990.2“* ed. (Jackson, Mississippi; University Press ofMississippi, 1991), 123.
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of civil rights moderates past the xisual demands of the NAACP and SCLC, thereby
paving the way for the movement’s second phase.
During World War n, the national civil rights movement engendered protests that
changed the face of America. For instance, in 1941, Asa Phillip Randolph’s call for a
March on Washington prompted President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to draft Executive
Order 8802, which prohibited discrimination in the employment of workers in the
defense industry and in the federal government. This order was the first presidential
action since Reconstruction to oppose legal discrimination. Also, in 1944, the Supreme
Court abolished the all-white Democratic Primary through Smith v. Allright.
These efforts intensified with the return of World War 11 veterans. On July 26,
1946, President Harry Truman abolished racial discrimination in federal employment.
Four days later, he signed Executive Order 9981 banning racial segregation in the
military. In the fall of that year, a group of civil rights leaders met with Truman at the
White House to discuss race relations in America. Two months later, the president
appointed a Committee on Civil Rights to investigate cases of racial discrimination The
Committee recormnended the renewal of the Fair Employment Practices Commission and
the creation of a permanent civil rights cormnission. In 1947, Jackie Robinson
accomplished the impossible by desegregating major league baseball, America’s pastime
and the symbol of white supremacy. That year, the Supreme Court ruled that Oklahoma
had to provide legal education to Ada Lois Sipuel in Sipuel v. Board ofRegents of the
University ofOklahoma. By the 1950s, the nation was primed to live up to the principles
of its Declaration of Independence, that all people were created equal and that each
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person had a God-given right to liberty. In 1950, civil rights leader Dr. Ralph Bunche
became the first African American to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for his brilliant work
in international relations. Bunche had graduated from Harvard with a doctorate in
government and international relations and conducted extensive research on African and
African-American communities. His work on Africa as well as the Far East made him
one of the key policy makers in those regions. In 1948 he served as mediator of the
United States Special Committee on Palestine and in 1949 his expertise led to an
armistice between Egypt and Israel.^
In 1950, the Supreme Court ruled that Texas had violated Herman Sweatt’s access
to an equal education under the Fourteenth Amendment in Sweatt v. Painter. The
outcome of Sipuel and Sweatt led to the 1954 Brown v. The Board ofEducation ruling,
where the Supreme Court ruled that “separate, but equal” was unconstitutional in the
nation’s schools. The following year, residents in Montgomery, Alabama, launched the
bus boycott, and in December 1956, the nation’s highest court ruled that Alabama law
separating African-Americans on public transportation was unconstitutional. This law
expanded the 1946 Morgan v. Virginia ruling where the Supreme Court ruled seven-to-
one that it was unlawfid to subject interstate passengers to state laws requiring segregated
seating. Less than a year later. Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act since
Reconstruction to protect Afiican-Americans’ right to vote and in the fall of 1957, federal
^ Darlene Clark Hine, William C. Hine, and Stanley Harrold, The African-American Odvssev
(Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 498.
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courts ordered school authorities to admit blacks to the all-white Central High School in
Little Rock, Arkansas.
By the early 1960s, new forces began to erode the entrenched opposition to
desegregation and to push the recalcitrant South toward greater compliance with the law
of the land.^ Numan Bartley’s excellent study ofmassive resistance argues persuasively
that when this reactionary doctrine was carried to its logical extreme with the closing of
public schools in Virginia and Arkansas, Southerners were forced to face the dilemma of
clinging to an archaic social system at the cost of regional economic progress and growth.
The closing of the schools to prevent court-ordered desegregation, Bartley declared,
represented a “policy of calculated anarchy,” and it not only “assaulted public education”
but it also “threatened the whole stmcture of southern society, the region’s economic
future and the vested interests of southern institutions.” Thus, when reason prevailed,
conservative and moderate white leaders recognized the folly of defending segregation
and began grudgingly accepting desegregation.”^
Progress, albeit halting, encouraged the African-American community to adopt
the strategies of sit-ins and freedom rides. In 1960, four African-American students
attending North Carolina A&T University in Greensboro attempted to desegregate local
restaurants by sitting at a lunch counter at a Woolworth’s store. Their efforts quickly
gained the support of their peers, black and white, and eventually the backing of the
African-American community. Sit-ins spread throughout the South, leading to the 1964
^ Numan Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 193.
"Ibid.
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“Freedom Rides” which sought to force states in the South to abide by the 1946 Morgan
V. Virginia r\i\mg.
Yet, as blacks gained more rights, hardcore segregationists became more violent.
White racists were determined to maintain segregation by any means necessary.
Although Mississippi earned notoriety as the heartland of racism and violence in
America, Alabama, the “heart of the southern confederacy,” was equally racist and
violent. In 1957, Willie Edwards, Jr. was forced to jump from a bridge because the Klan
in Montgomery thought he was dating a white woman. His body was found several days
later. In 1961, Freedom Riders were bombed and beaten by racists in Anniston,
Alabama. This pattern would continue in 1963 where Birmingham police turned water
hoses and unleashed attack dogs on innocent men, women and children. In May 1963,
the black-owned A.G. Gaston hotel, the headquarters of the SCLC, and the home ofA.D.
King were bombed. On September 15, 1963, white racists detonated a bomb in the
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, killing four black girls, Addie Mae Collins, Denise
McNair, Carole Robertson, and Cynthia Wesley. On that same day. Virgin Lamar War
was killed in Birmingham. In 1965 Jimmie Lee Jackson, the Reverend James Reeb, Viola
Gregg Luizzo, and Jonathan Daniels were murdered because of their participation in the
civil rights movement in Alabama.^
Hence, the modem movement, organized to bring African Americans into an era
of justice and equality, was scarred by violence. Scholarly studies suggest that few black
communities experienced social change without an enormous degree of conflict and
^Ibid.
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violence. Most civil rights literature concentrates on the movement in major southern
cities. With regard to Alabama, research has focused on the cities of Birmingham,
Montgomery, and Selma, in that order.
The media has likewise displayed only passing interest in cities that were spared
massive demonstrations. Journalists and scholars alike have paid little attention to cities
that did not fit into that paradigm. Yet, as historian Robert Norrell maintains, every
community has a story to tell.^ The disproportionate amoxmt of attention accorded to
these cities has eclipsed the significance of considerable achievements made by the
Afiican-American commimities outside of “hotbeds” of racial intolerance and violence.
Many heroic people and organizations in Mobile, Alabama, have yet to be given the place
in the literature that they deserve. Few historians of the civil rights movement have
studied the Mobile movement, where violence was not center-stage, and where national
civil rights leaders did not assemble in mass protest.
On more than one occasion, between 1940 and 1960, the residents of Mobile
earned civil rights well in advance of other cities and towns in the south. The
achievements of Mobile’s black community prepared the ground for social change
throughout Alabama. By the early 1960s, this community had successfully desegregated
lunch coimters, fast food restaurants, public education, higher education, the public
library, the Girl Scout Council, the Young Women's Christian Association, the Medical
Society of Mobile, and the city's golf course. Afiican Americans were being hired in
several municipal government positions, including the police and fire departments as well
* Robert Norrell, Reaping of the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York:
Vintage Books, 1985), 1.
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in public transportation. In addition. Mobile’s African-American community was deeply
involved in local, regional, and national political activism and was instrumental in
defeating one of the most racist voting laws imposed on Alabama’s blacks since the post-
Reconstruction period.^
This dissertation will examine Mobile’s modem civil rights movement from 1942
to 1963, by exploring the African-American community’s stmggle for social equality
through the NAACP and grassroots organizations, including the Negro Veterans and
Voters League (NWL), and Non-Voters Partisan League (NVPL). In addition, this
study will document the impact of the unique success of the Mobile African-American
civil rights movement on regional and national movements.
In accomplishing this task, this dissertation answers two questions. First, during
the height of the civil rights protest, how did African Americans in Mobile accomplish
more in the struggle for civil rights than other major cities in Alabama? Mobile’s black
leadership successfully negotiated civil rights for blacks in the city long before most
African-American communities in Alabama did. The civil rights achieved by the black
community made Mobile the envy of the state. Blacks were prominent in politics,
organizing efforts to defeat both the Alabama Democratic primary and the Boswell
Amendment, which had worked to disenfranchised blacks since the early 1900s. The
community also distinguished itself in desegregating public accommodations and public
education. Blacks integrated Mobile’s Spring Hill College in 1954 and integrated the
’ John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972.
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University of Alabama in 1963. Mobile civil rights activist Janice LeFlore recalled
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s admiration for John LeFlore, who launched the fight against
racial injustice in the South before King and others joined the battle.* King also used the
Mobile movement and its civil rights leaders as models for achieving civil rights in the
South. In his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” King viewed Mobile’s Spring Hill
College as a paradigm for achievement in education in the South.” Prior to the
Montgomery bus boycott in 1955, King suggested that the city ofMontgomery follow the
city bus ordinances that were already in place in Mobile.
Second, what allowed the Mobile community to escape the outbreaks of violence
in Montgomery, Birmingham, Selma and Anniston, Alabama? Although the Mobile
community suffered turmoil during its civil rights movement, it never reached the scale
of that of many southern cities. Compared to most areas in Alabama, blacks in Mobile
achieved their civil rights through a relatively peaceful process. Again, civil rights
leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. often examined the successful strategies
employed by the black community in Mobile before attempting to gain certain rights in
Montgomery. According to civil rights leader O. B. Purifory, King was impressed by
Mobile’s success and would discuss with black leaders in Mobile the methods used to
win civil rights.*®
Documentaiy, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore,” Museum ofMobile, 1999.
’
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America In The King Years. 1954-1963 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988), 167.
Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story of John LeFlore,” Musuem ofMobile, 1999.
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An analysis of the results and consequences of African-American activism in
Mobile and a comparison ofthe Mobile movement to its counterparts in Birmingham and
Montgomery, will be the final focus of this research. Although there was no watershed
moment that ushered in the era ofblack activism in Mobile, the ongoing struggle for civil
rights intensified in 1942 with the planned “Mobile bus boycott” that followed the
murder of a local African-American soldier. O. B. Purifory described this period as the
time when blacks in Mobile knew that they had to test the “winds” of social change.^*
Indeed, change did come and Mobile’s Afiican-American community became one
of the most identifiable instruments for social liberation in Alabama. A tenacious
leadership, a growing political maturity, and the ability to negotiate with city leaders
positioned the African-American community in Mobile to take a powerful stance against
Jim Crow.
The period examined in this dissertation expands what many scholars have
traditionally identified as the modem Civil Rights Movement. Most researchers date the
birth of the movement either to Brown v. The Board ofEducation, in 1954, or to the
Montgomery boycott in 1955.^^ This research, along with a growing number of historical
perspectives, including Robert Norrell’s contention that the Civil Rights Movement
began in Tuskegee as early as 1941 and Jo Ann Robinson’s assertion that blacks in
” Mobile Register. “Purifoy; Racial Division is Saddening,” 14 February 1993,2.
James H. Cone, Martin. Malcolm and America: A Dream or a Nightmare (Maiyknoll, New
York: Orbis Book, 1991), 227; ManningMarable, Race. Reform, and Rebellion: The Second
Reconstruction in Black America. 1945-1990.2“* ed. (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of
Mississippi, 1991), 123.
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Montgomery were active long before the advent of its bus boycott, illustrates the
movement’s ascent prior to the 1950s.
In addition, scholars have tended to approach the Civil Rights Movement from a
national perspective, often ignoring the experiences of the people whose lives were
touched by the struggle for equality on a daily basis. Therefore, the Mobile study does
not only rely upon the traditional sources; it investigates newspapers and journals,
manuscript collections, and government documents. Personal interviews, letters, and
telegrams written by local individuals and organizations will be used to delve into the
lives ofthe activists.
Recent works on the impact of local movements include Glerm Eskew’s But for
Birmingham: The Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights Movement:
William Henry Chafe’s Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina, and the
Black Struggle for Freedom: John Dittmer’s Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights
in Mississippi: Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light ofFreedom: The Organizing Tradition
and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle: and Robert A. Pratt’s We Shall not be Moved:
The Desegregation of the University ofGeorgia.
Eskew’s work emphasized the importance of local movements in the South,
particularly in Birmingham, Alabama, and its connection with the national movements.
According to Eskew, the national movement often acted as a liaison between the local
movement and the federal government, which benefited the black community because
politicians in Washington had the power to enact change in race relations in the South.
However, the federal government, which left the power of change in the hands of local
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authorities and influential White southerners in Congress, accentuated the problems of
ending racial discrimination from the top down. Thus, local movements became the
cornerstone of the modem civil rights. The impetus from the bottom transformed the
top.
William Chafe’s Civil Liberties and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina,
and the Black Struggle for Freedom examines the sit-ins in Greensboro, North Carolina,
from the 1940s through the 1960s. His study reveals the strength of grassroots
participation in the stmggle for civil rights in the South. Chafe traces the process of the
sit-in movements. He illustrates the legacy of black protest in the African-American
community, which made it possible for the four sit-in demonstrations acting in the first
place. He also examines the various ways in which white political and economic leaders
sought to contain and diffuse the many strategies of rebellion. Moreover, Chafe narrates
the enduring and unremitting features of the stmggle to achieve social justice in
America.*'*
Charles Payne’s I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the
Mississippi Stmggle examines the civil rights movement in Mississippi, particularly the
small town of Greenwood. Blacks in Greenwood had limited education, economics and
knowledge about politics during the 1950s. Yet, without resources and experienced
Glenn Eskew. But for Birmingham: the Local and National Movements in the Civil Rights
Struggle for Freedom (Chapel Hill: The University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1997), 16,17.
William Chafe, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina, and the Black
Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), viii.
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national leadership, Greenwood’s blacks created the first successful civil rights campaign
in the rural South. According to Payne:
A great deal has been written about the various national civil rights organizations
and their leaders. The sheer volume of material written fi'om a top down
perspective implies that the dynamism of the movement is to be understood in
terms of these national leaders and national organizations. But the more closely
one looks at the history, the less comfortable one becomes with reducing the tens
of thousand of people across the South who participated in the local movement to
faceless masses, singing, praying, and marching in Ae backgroimd.*^
Similar to Payne’s work, John Dittmer’s Local People: The Struggle for Civil
Rights in Mississippi critiques the Mississippi civil rights movement in light ofgrassroots
leaders and organizations. Dittmer minimizes the function of the federal government and
even the NAACP, which does not come into its own in Mississippi until the mid-1950s.
He attributes the success of the civil rights movement in Mississippi to local Afiican-
American visionaries who were determined to gain their civil rights. Dittmer asserts that
unknown citizens paved the way for subsequent popular movements. According to
Dittmer, these “brothers and sisters in search of the Beloved Commimity” challenged
fellow Mississippians to live up to the meaning of equality and laid the foundation for a
new society. They opened the doors to political enfiunchisement, and made it possible
for a new generation of blacks to gain civil rights.Robert Pratt’s We Shall Not be
Moved: The Desegregation of the University of Georgia also investigates the role of the
local black community at the University of Georgia. Pratt chronicles Horace Ward’s
Charles Payne, I’ve Got the Light ofFreedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi
Struggle (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1995), 3.
John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana and Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 1994), 429.
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attempt to integrate the university’s law school in 1950 and the admissions of Hamilton
Earl Holmes and Charlayne Alberta Hunter in 1962. Similar to other community studies,
Pratt’s work, through a plethora of personal interviews, lends support to (1) a need to
expand the basis of traditional research when conducting studies on the civil rights
movement; and (2) a need to include the masses who inspired the national leaders and
organizations to join the civil rights struggle.
In addition, one of the most unique works to examine this era is Women in the
Civil Rights Movement, edited by Vicki Crawford, Jacqueline A. Rouse and Barbara
Woods. This edited volume represents recent scholarship, which investigates the
contribution of women to the black freedom struggle. While rarely national leaders,
women were central to the success of the movement at the local level. Several important
essays in this book highlight lesser known women such as Septima Clark, Unita
Blackwell, Jo Ann Robinson, Ella Baker and others who were pivotal to the movement’s
development.
Recent works, conducted mainly by local scholars, on blacks in Mobile suggest
that during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s the African-American community was one of the
most active and successful in the South. Melton McLaurin’s article, “Mobile Blacks and
World War U: the Development of a Political Consciousness,” (1980) examines the
economic and social impact ofWorld War 11 on Mobile’s black community. According
to McLaurin:
A war time economy and the rhetoric of a democracy at war sparked within the
Mobile black community a hope for a better life. Returning black veterans
demanded the rights their service had helped secure. Their presence lent
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determination and moral force to the reform efforts of such organizations as the
NAACP and the Negro Voters and Veterans Association.*^
McLaurin also contends that the war gave birth to the Mobile movement, which he
describes as one of the most important civil rights efforts in the South. Bruce Nelson’s
article, “Organized Labor and the Struggle for Black Equality in Mobile during World
War n,” (1993) examines the impact of organized labor on Mobile’s economic landscape.
Nelson maintains that the black community’s participation in organized labor made it one
of the most economically progressive in Alabama.*’ Keith Nicholls’ “The Non-Partisan
Voters League of Mobile, Alabama; Its Founding and Major Accomplishments” (1995)
focuses on the social and political impact of the League, Mobile’s most effective civil
rights organization after the demise of the state’s NAACP in 1956. The locally
acclaimed 1999 documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story of John LeFlore,”
highlights the success and significance of the Mobile movement during the life of its
most outstanding civil rights leader. Other local historians, including Jay Higginbothan
have conducted seminal research on the Mobile conununity. In Higginbothan’s Mobile:
A City by the Bay, the author describes the progressive racial climate as well as the
relative racial harmony that have characterized the city since the days of its founding.
’’ Melton A. McLaniin, “Mobile Blacks and WorldWar II: The Development ofa Political
Consciousness.” GulfCoast Politics in the Twentieth Century. (Pensacola, Fla., 1973), 55.
Ibid., 47-56.
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Bruce Nelson, “Organized Labor and the Struggle for Black Equality in Mobile duringWorld
War II,” The Journal ofAmerican History 80 (December 1993), 952-985.
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It should not be surprising that cities such as Mobile remained peripheral to
scholarly research. Yet, because of its many accomplishments during America’s most
turbulent years of the twentieth century, and its compelling influence on the social
climate in Alabama, including Birmingham, Montgomery and Selma, the lack of
historical accounts makes it an irresistible research topic.
The struggle for equality and the development of a black political consciousness
in Mobile created one of the most determined, unique, and most successful communities
in the South. This is the story ofMobile and its black citizens who took a journey often
filled with trepidation and uncertainty matched only by their courage, endurance, and the
will to live their lives with the highest degree of human dignity. The written and oral
accounts of the civil rights movement in Mobile will inspire future generations to make
America what Martin Luther King, Jr. envisioned—The Beloved Community.
CHAPTER ONE
THE BIRTH OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN MOBILE, ALABAMA,
1942-1944
With regard to the many problems confronting the colored people who ride the
buses, the management courteously took the committee’s recommendations under
advisement and a definite decision in the matter is expected in a few days, hi the
meantime, the Citizens Committee is holding in abeyance until Sunday, August
30*. Any and all procedure will be lawfully utilized in an effort to protect the
rights of colored citizens and avoid a recurrence of the tragic happening which
resulted in the death of an American soldier on what appears to have been the
altar of race prejudice. You are urged to attend a special mass meeting at the
Metropolitan A.M.E. Church. It is your duty to be present.
Mobile NAACP, August 15,1942
Introduction
The civil rights movement came of age during the mid-1950s when the southern
black masses overcame the trepidation of reprisals to strike their first blow against the
discriminatory practices of segregation in the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955-56.'
However, important to the expanding academic revisions that are now reshaping the
scholarship of the civil rights movement, prior to the bus boycott in Montgomery, the
black community had already proven its ability to mobilize for full citizenship rights.
The NAACP, as well as grassroots organizations and private citizens, had been
challenging the systematic practices of segregation in the courts since the 1940s. In
' James H. Cone, Martin. Malcolm and America (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Book, 1991), 59.
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1941, for instance, Asa Phillip Randolph’s call for a March on Washington prompted
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to draft Executive Order #8802, which prohibited
discrimination in the employment of workers in the defense industry and in the federal
government. This order also established the Federal Employment Practices Commission
(FEPC). It was the first presidential action to oppose legal discrimination since
Reconstruction. In 1944, the Supreme Court abolished the all-white Democratic Primary
through Smith v. Allright. On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman abolished racial
discrimination in federal employment. Four days later, he passed Executive Order
#9981, banning racial segregation in the military. In the fall of that same year, a group
of civil rights leaders met with President Harry Truman at the White House to discuss
race relations in America. Two months later Truman, appointed a Committee on Civil
Rights to investigate cases of racial discriminatioa Significantly, the Committee
recommended the renewal of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) and
the creation of a permanent civil rights commission.
During the 1940s, black activism and social organizations that demanded racial
justice were appearing in various towns and cities across the South. Although many of
these individuals and organizations did not make the press, their impact on civil rights in
numerous black communities in the South was profound. For example, in his Reaping the
Whirlvyind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee. Robert Norrell cogently argues
that, not only were blacks in Tuskegee, Alabama, actively involved in a modem
^
George B. Tindall, David E. Shi, and Thomas Lee Pearcy, The Essential America (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 518.
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movement for civil rights prior to the Brown decision in 1954, but they had achieved
rights that were unmatched in other parts of the coimtry.^
One of the most fascinating and successful civil rights movements in the South,
prior to 1954, was led by the African-American community in Mobile, Alabama. The
Mobile Movement impact was felt throughout the South and influenced the emergence of
movements in other locales. Mobile surpassed other Southern towns and cities in gaining
civil rights for its black residents between the 1940s and 1960s. Compared to other cities.
Mobile’s civil rights movement was distinctively successful, yet quiet. The black
community achieved civil rights earlier and more quickly than did Birmingham and
Montgomery. Thus, while many black communities in the South, and particularly in
Alabama, won social equality through demonstrations that sometimes resulted in
bloodshed. Mobile’s blacks attained many of their rights through the tactics that produced
relatively littleviolnce."*
The campaign for civil rights in Mobile began in the early 1940s, when a black
soldier. Private Henry Williams, was shot and killed by a white bus driver. The incident
outraged the black citizens of Mobile and led to the birth of organized protest; the
emergence of the local NAACP, the expanding role of the black church and labor unions
in the quest for civil rights; and the foundation for the birth of active grassroots
organizations in the local area. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the forces
^ Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York:
Vintage Books, 1985), 1.
*
Documentary “A Quiet Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore,” Museum ofMobile, 1999.
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behind the planned bus boycott and show how through well-organized strategies, patient,
but persistent negotiation, and nonviolent direct action, the black community in Mobile
achieved civil rights and became the paradigm of black success for social equality in
Alabama during the early 1940s.
The History ofMobile
The history of antebellum Mobile set the tone for post-Reconstruction
developments and the early years of the twentieth century. Although a city located in the
deep South, Mobile had many characteristics of cities located north of the Mason-Dixon
line. The city was established, in 1812, by proclamation ofGovernor Wendell Holmes of
the Mississippi Territory, seven years before Alabama became a state. Named after Fort
Louis de la Mobile, a French fortification erected near Mount Vernon in 1702, “Mobile”
is thought to have been derived fi’om the Choctaw word for “paddlers.” European settlers
arrived in Mobile in the early 1700s.
Besides giving the city its name, the French were the first Europeans to occupy
this land. These Old World travelers appeared in 1702 and established their first
permanent colony in 1711. They occupied this territory for almost half a century before
ceding it to the British in the Treaty of Paris in 1763. The treaty forced France to
relinquish its territory east of the Mississippi to England but reserved western Louisiana
and New Orleans for Spain. The British occupied the territory fi-om 1763 to 1780 when
Spanish forces invaded the Mobile Bay under Don Bernardo de Galvez, Governor of
Louisiana, and took possession of the territory until General James Wilkinson defeated
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the Spaniards and claimed Mobile for the United States in 1813. For a brief time imder
French rule (1720), Mobile was heralded as the capital of the French provinces of
Louisiana, which extended from the Gulf of Mexico into Canada and westward to the
Rocky Mountains.^
Because of the countries that occupied Mobile in its early years, it acquired many
qualities of an international town. A socially and culturally diverse community. Mobile
attracted Catholic immigrants from France, Spain, Ireland, and southern Germany, in
addition to Protestants from northern Germany, England, and Sweden. It had a sizable
Jewish population; most came from Western Europe and arrived after 1850. Sailors
from the north and from around the globe also made the port city a permanent or
temporary home. Mobile society became known for its sizable upper class whose wealth
was based upon trade. Its politics reflected national, as opposed to regional, priorities,
and its economy was an important contributor to the wealth of the nation as a whole. As
late as the 1880s, a reporter for Harper’s Weekly asserted that the population in Mobile
was more varied in nationality and descent than that of any other city in the United
States.^
Perhaps the aspect that distinguished Mobile from other communities in the
antebellum South was its black population. There were few large plantations in Mobile.
Most of the enslaved blacks lived in the city and experienced an unusual degree of
^ Lucile Grifith, Alabama: A History to 1900 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University ofAlabama, 1968),
153.
* Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 158.
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autonomy, which allowed them an inordinate amoxmt of contact with the world beyond
the household of the master. Because ofMobile’s commercial economy, enslaved blacks
acquired skills in brick masonry, carpentry, and cotton sampling. Some slaves had
become so skilled in sampling cotton that they were often mistaken for managing large
cargos of ships carrying cotton Even more impressive, compared to other towns and
cities in Alabama, Mobile had a sizable free black population ^
Throughout the antebellum period, Mobile was home for more than half of the
state’s free black population. Most ofMobile’s free blacks were “Creole,” ofAfrican and
French or Spanish descent and many of them gained their freedom under the terms of the
Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. Terms of the Treaty called for all Spanish citizens, many of
whom were Creole, to be accorded all the rights and privileges of all U.S. citizens. Others
migrated to Mobile after the Haitian Revolution.* According to historian Alan Smith
Thompson whose work provides a comprehensive examination of Mobile prior to the
Civil War:
White fathers generally provided the economic means by which their children
could survive, and during the antebellum years some of these mulatto families
successfully built upon the resources that were left to them. The French and
Spanish had acquired large quantities of land which worked with slave labor, and
the free Negroes frequently inherited both land and slaves.’
’ Alan Smith Thompson, Mobile. Alabama 1850-1861: economic, physical, and population
characteristics (Tuscaloosa: The University ofAlabama Press, 1979), 2; Michael W. Fitzgerald, Urban
Emancipation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2002), 10,11.
* John B. Boles, Black Southerners 1619-1869 (University of Kentucky, 1983), 134.
’ibid.
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Compared to most blacks in the South, Mobile’s blacks were well-educated.
Although an 1832 Alabama law prohibited blacks from being educated, as early as 1833,
Mobile made provisions to educate its Creole children. In 1844, Mobile licensed its first
Creole teachers and in 1850 the Catholic Church opened several schools for Creole
children. In Mobile: City By the Bay. Jay Higginbotham writes:
Mobile [blacks] were always a notch above the rest of the [black] brethren in
other towns throughout the South, even back in the slave days. The [blacks] in
Mobile didn’t usually pick cotton or hoe weeds way out in the field somewhere.
They stayed close to home, were personal servants, ran errands, helped then-
masters in business. As a result they learned to read and write and to compete in
the free world when emancipation came.*®
By 1850, the free black community worked as carpenters, boatmen, cigar makers,
bricklayers, masons, barbers, coppersmiths, shopkeepers, cotton samplers, and draymen.
Free blacks were so highly skilled that they held jobs that a number ofwhites would have
been proud to have.** By the end of the antebellum period, the black community in
Mobile was ably prepared to live and prosper in freedom. However, like most southern
blacks, the post-Reconstruction era led to unprecedented hardship. Although legalized
segregation and disenfranchisement slowed black progress in Mobile to a crawl, race
relations in Mobile remained relatively calm until the early 1940s. Part of the reason
was due to the historical socioeconomic makeup of the Mobile community. According to
the Mobile housing census, blacks and whites in Mobile had quietly lived side-by-side
Higginbotham, Mobile: City by the Bay. 200,201.
" Harriet Elizabeth Amos, Social Life in an Antebellum Cotton Port: Mobile. Alabama 1820-
1860 (Ph.D. diss., Atlanta: Emory University), 1976, 335.
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since the late 1800s.*^ Perhaps more relevant to the treatment of the black community by
Whites was the fact that the Mobile economy depended greatly on the national and
international climate, particularly during the late 1930s with the onset of World War II.
The state’s only seaport. Mobile received millions of dollars through federal contracts to
build ships during the Second World War. White leaders became more affable towards
the African-American community in Mobile because they did not want to risk the
possibility of loosing millions of dollars in revenue due to blacks organizing and
protesting for racial equality.
Mobile’s sense of racial harmony was similar to the one embraced by the
municipal leadership in the other great cosmopolitan center of the South, Atlanta,
Georgia. Mobile had more in common with Atlanta than it did with its sister cities
Birmingham and Montgomery. For example, Birmingham witnessed many episodes of
racial polarization and violence during its own civil rights movement. However,
Atlanta’s leadership, which proclaimed its city as “too busy to hate,” negotiated with the
black community and moved through this critical period in relative peace. During the
early 1940s, Atlanta’s population of 331,000 was more numerous than Birmingham’s
326,000; by 1970, Atlanta’s population had outgrown Birmingham’s by almost
200,000. With the exception of Huntsville, Mobile was the only major city in Alabama
to experience significant demographic growth. This growth was based on economic
Housing Census, 1900, City ofMobile, Alabama.
William Warren Rogers, Robert David Ward, Leah Rawls Atkins, and Wayne Flynt. Alabama:
The History ofA Deep South State (Tuscaloosa: University ofAlabama, 1994), 168.
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prosperity which was tied to leadership keeping, or at least appearing to keep, racial
tensions under control. Violence disrupted the pattern of economic growth, and until the
great migration of rural whites into Mobile, white leaders preferred to avoid riots and
demonstrations whenever possible. However, after World War H, this would not always
be easy to accomplish.
The Birth ofMobile’s Modem Civil Rights Movement
By the late 1930s and early 1940s, and due partly to the start ofWorld War H, the
dawn of a new social climate transpired for blacks in America. This period flourished
with the vitality of a new hope and engendered an era of protest that changed the face of
America. Asa Philip Randolph’s proposed March on Washington in 1941 became a
popular method for black social protest as it raised the level of social consciousness in
America. Randolph was highly respected and had become a symbol of black leadership
for numerous blacks around the nation and in Alabama. According to Taylor Branch in
Parting the Waters: America in the King Years. 1954-1963. E.D. Nixon, who actually
proposed the bus boycott in Montgomery, “almost worshipped Randolph.”*** This
heightened sense of urgency was epitomized in the South, where certain communities,
which had been marginalized socially, politically and economically, demanded equal
rights. Hence, the call for racial equality chimed no less true for blacks in Mobile as its
Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America In The King Years. 1954-1963 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1988), 121.
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black community organized and initiated one of the South’s most successful civil rights
movements.
It is no coincidence that the Mobile movement coincided with the Second World
War. As Hitler marched across Europe in an effort to conquer the Western hemisphere.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt assured his European allies that he would provide them
with the necessary resources to fight the war, which included supplying them with ships,
planes, guns, and tanks. Roosevelt tasked the nation's defense industry to build these
items. His efforts led to an immediate demand for labor in numerous coastal cities in the
United States, including Mobile, which had over $150,000,000 worth of defense work.*^
The city quickly became one of the top job markets in the South attracting thousands of
black and white families to the area.
Almost overnight. Mobile became a national leader in shipbuilding when it was
tasked to construct 196 vessels for the war effort. Many of the workers hired to build
these vessels were black and represented a range of social backgrounds. Moreover, the
growth of the city attracted some of the most outstanding local and national leaders.
Longtime civil right’s stalwart and co-leader of the Birmingham movement, Fred
Shuttlesworth, and local political and civil rights leaders Robert Gilliard and O. B.
Purifoy, moved to Mobile during the 1940s. As it turned out. Mobile became the home
of Shuttlesworth’s spiritual rebirth.*^ Similar to many civil rights leaders in the black
Letter from J. L. LeFlore to Miss Black, 8 November 1941, Branch Files, 1940-1955, Series A,
The South.
** Andrew M. Mannis, A Fire You Can’t Put Out: The Fred Shuttlesworth Story (Tuscaloosa:
University ofAlabama, 1999), 121.
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community, it would be through Shuttlesworth’s spiritual renewal or religious “calling”
that he would find meaning and courage to battle the social inequality. Shuttlesworth
would foimd the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), the most
important civil rights organization in Birmingham after the demise of the NAACP in
Alabama in 1956, and become one of the most important leaders of the civil rights
movement. These men as well as other Afiican Americans, who made dynamic
contributions to the Mobile movement, were lured to Mobile’s economic promise.
Moreover, by 1953, the growth of the local churches led the United Methodist
Conference to appoint one of its most charismatic leaders and co-foimders of the SCLC,
Joseph Echols Lowery, to the Warren Street United Methodist Church. Even more.
Mobile became a wartime transportation center and the Army Air Corps acquired Bates
Field where thousands of civilians and military personnel and their families migrated to
the city.
This booming economy in Mobile created a labor market for skilled carpenters,
salesmen, and service personnel, thus increasing the region’s population. For example, in
1940, the population in Mobile was 78,720. By 1943, the population had swelled to over
125,000. The black population in Mobile grew from 29,000 to 46,000, and the white
population grew from approximately 50,000 to almost 80,000.*^ Overall, the population
explosion, which was tied directly to economic expansion, led to an increase that almost
doubled the city’s population in three years, quickly reshaping the social and racial
U.S., Bureau of the Census, City ofMobile, Ala., United States Manuscript Census of the
Population: 1940-1950.
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relations in the city over the next two decades. For example, a large number of whites
relocated from other parts of the rural South and arrived with an elevated sense of racial
superiority. When forced to socialize with blacks, particularly on an equal basis, they
often reacted with threats and physical violence.** Although native whites in Mobile
rarely accepted blacks socially and perpetuated black subjugation, they seldom reacted
violently as a means to social control. According to former mayor and native Mobilian,
Joseph Langan, the population explosion experienced by Mobile changed the city
significantly:
When I returned from the War [World War II], one of the most visible changes in
Mobile was its stand on segregation. It had become more segregated and racially
intolerant. Before I left the city to join the military. Mobile had been a city where
families had lived together for many years, and many Mobilians, including
myself, had grown up living on the same block, in the same neighborhood and
had become fiiends with blacks.*^
Consequently, not only did the number of whites migrating to the city interrupt
Mobile’s normal pattern of interaction or code of conduct between blacks and whites, but
the increase in the number of blacks migrating to the city also became the vanguard for
the development of a stronger, more stable, yet less tolerant black community. Blacks
sought the same ends as rural whites who migrated to Mobile. The reality was that this
new force added numerical strength that would not only affect Mobile’s economy, but its
** Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970; Joseph Langan, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 12 November 1999;
Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story of John LeFlore,” 1999; Melton McLaurin, “Mobile
Blacks and WorldWar II: The Development ofa Political Consciousness,” GulfCoast Politics in the
Twentieth Century (Pensacola, Fla., 1973), 48.
Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970.
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politics as well. These new residents became the initial driving force behind the birth of
Mobile’s modem civil rights movement.
TheMobile Bus Boycott, 1942
Since 1881, the system ofpublic transportation in the South had been segregated.
With the introduction of the municipal bus system, most blacks were forced to pay their
fares at the front, then leave the bus and reboard at the back. They faced systematic
harassment from white drivers, who sometimes pulled away before black passengers
could reboard. Many blacks sat behind a mobile barrier dividing the races, and as the bus
filled, the barrier was pushed back to make room for white passengers. No black person
could sit in the same row as a white, and whites had priority in this middle “no-man's
land.” Blacks were frequent victims of physical and psychological abuse. A white
conductor in Birmingham observing blacks getting on his trolley maintained, “Right there
is where our next war will break out.”^^ Indeed, the transportation system provided the
context for one of the most notorious incidents of racial violence in Mobile and launched
the direct action phase of its modem civil rights movement.^^
The segregated seating policies in the state of Alabama, as well as local
ordinances, often fioistrated Mobile’s black community. The appointment of five black
John L. LeFIore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970,9 October 1972.
Robin D. G. Kelley, “The Black Poor and the Politics ofOpposition in a New South City, 1929-
1970,” in The “Underclass” Debate: Views from History, ed. Michael B. Katz (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), 305-09.
“ Bruce Nelson, “Organized labor and the Struggle for Black Equality during World War IF’ in
The Journal ofAmerican History. (1993), 967,968.
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women to the public relations department in 1940 does not seem to have reduced the
number of grievances that were lodged with the bus company.By the early 1940s, the
NAACP had heard enough complaints and was well aware that the bus company was
indifferent to them. According to Michael L. Jackson, president of the NAACP in
Mobile, and John LeFlore:
It seems self-evident that there has been no determined effort upon the part of
local officials of the bus company to afford proper protection to Colored patrons
against humiliation, insult and even bodily harm imposed on them by bus drivers,
police officers, civil guards and even fellow-passengers of the white race.^'^
Part of the problem arose from the flood ofjob-seekers who moved to Mobile during the
1940s. According to Mobile’s NAACP, the growing racial tensions on the buses were
due to overcrowding that forced riders to compete for seats.^^
Racial segregation in the transportation system grew more rigid as the 1940s wore
on. In January of 1942, Sam Knox and Lonnie Moffett were fined $25 each when a city
bus driver testified that they refused to occupy empty seats in the rear of the bus.^^ The
abuses on Mobile’s transit system apparently remained more psychological than physical
and were at least tolerable relative to the conditions in other cities around the state.
Lancie Thomas, wife of editor Frank Thomas, founder of the Mobile Beacon, states that
“ “History ofthe Mobile Branch of the N.A.A.C.P.,” May 1,1942, Branch Files, 1940-1955,
Series A, The South. Limited information exists on these individuals.
M.J. Jackson and J.L. LeFlore to Byron E. Pickering, August 25, 1942, Branch Files, 1940-
1955, Series A, The South.
Ibid.
“ Mobile Register. “Two Negroes Fined For Conduct on Bus,” 11 January 1942.
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when she moved to Mobile in 1941, racial conditions were not “all that bad, even on the
buses.”^^ Longtime resident Edward Antone was a teenager during the war years and
remembers the bus situation being calm prior to the killing of Private Williams. Echoing
the sentiments of the local NAACP, Antone recalls the buses being overcrowded. He
maintains that in some instances the buses would have to make at least three trips to pick
up all the riders.^* Although it is unlikely that Thomas, Antone and the NAACP would
discount racism as a factor in the bus crisis, it is a fact that none of them believed that
race was the sole cause of the problem.
However, the relatively peacefiil environment that existed between blacks and
whites in Mobile and the subdued attitude of most blacks dealing with racism and
discrimination would be severely tested in August 1942, when Private Henry Williams
was brutally murdered while en route to Brookley Field, where he was stationed. The
shooting took place at North Royal and Adams Streets, aboard an inbound Cedar-Davis
bus, mostly an all-black route. The altercation started when Williams confronted Grover
E. Chandler, the white bus driver, who was conversing with another white bus driver.
Williams, who insisted that he would be late to work, requested that Chandler stop
talking and drive the bus. The men argued and as Williams reached back to retrieve his
^ Lancie Thomas, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 15 May 2002.
Edward Antone, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 12 November May 2001.
” Mobile Register. “Some Problems of the Negro in Mobile,” 16 August 1942.
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bag. Chandler pulled out his pistol and shot Williams three times—once in the head, once
in the neck, and once in the arm, killing him instantly.^”
Although blacks, and particularly young black men, had routinely endured abuse
and humiliation at the hands of white officials, the shooting had a tremendous impact.
Williams was a soldier fighting a war for freedom and democracy abroad. Even more
appalling was the fact that he was murdered while in uniform. For blacks in Mobile, the
nightmare of racial injustice had become an undeniable reality.^*
The following day. Colonel Vincent B. Dixon, Commander at Brookley Field,
appointed a board to investigate the shooting. White civilian leadership acted just as
expeditiously. Chandler, charged with murder in the connection with the death of Private
Williams, was bound over to the grand jury on $3500 bail and arraigned on August 18,
1942.^^ The initial investigation by the military proved inconclusive and evidence
suggested that its ongoing investigation provided little more than a “smoke-screen” to
satisfy what Colonel Dixon considered to be the military’s legal obligation. Eventually,
Colonel Dixon maintained that the military authorities could not prosecute a civilian for
killing a soldier unless the act was committed on a federal reservation. The bus
company granted Chandler leave with pay, depending on the outcome of the trial.
Mobile Register. “Negro Private Killed Aboard City Lines Bus,” 16 August 1942.
Letter from John L. LeFlore to Byron E. Pickering, 25 August 1942, Branch Files, 1940-1955,
Series A, The South.
Mobile Register. “Hearing Due Today In Negro’s Death,” 18 August 1942. “Driver ofBus
allowed Bond on Slaying Charge.” Mobile Press, 19 August 1942.
Letter from John L. LeFlore to Colonel Dbcon, Brookley Air Depot, 17 October 1942, LeFlore
Papers.
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Eventually, like so many other whites in the South who had unashamedly violated the
black community. Chandler would be acquitted and resume his duties for the City Bus
Line. Yet, as information about this brutal event circulated throughout the African-
American community, local blacks were “deeply aroused over the killing of Private
Henry Williams.”^'* Moreover, in a letter written to the Superintendent of Mobile Light
and Railroad Company, the NAACP expressed its frustration with management. The
“apparent failure of the bus management to act firmly and impartially as a matter of
public policy to prevent race trouble, in our opinion, led to the tragic killing of an
American soldier in uniform.”^^ The fact that over 100 new members joined Mobile’s
NAACP within two weeks of the killing ofWilliams indicated the depth of feeling about
the murder. By May 1943, over one thousand new names were on the roster of
Mobile’sNAACP.”
Finally, after almost a week of meeting and negotiation, the members of the
NAACP met with the black community at Metropolitan A.M.E. church on Davis Avenue
to discuss recommendations and possible action. One consideration was to protest, in the
form of a boycott of the Mobile transit system if the demands were not met. In
attendance were M. L. Jackson, President of the NAACP, Branch secretary John LeFlore,
Letter from LeFlore to RoyWilkins, 2 September 1942, Branch Files, 1940-1955, Series A,
The South.
” Letter to Byron Pickering from the NAACP, 26 August 1942, LeFlore Papers.
“ Ibid.
Letter from John L. LeFlore to Miss Lucile Black, 12 May 1943, LeFlore Papers.
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N. Rivers, contractor. Professor C.E. Powell, Principal ofDunbar High School, Cleveland
Woolfe, President of International Longshoremen’s Association Local 1410; the
Reverend H. E. Carter, Pastor of the Ann Street Presbyterian Church, Frank P. Thomas,
editor of the Mobile Weekly Review. Like John L. LeFlore, Frank P. Thomas went on to
become one of Mobile’s most respected civil rights leaders. Bom in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, on May 13, 1913, Thomas’ interest began in journalism at the age of eight
when he hawked the Tuscaloosa Times. As a young man, he served as a part-time
reporter and circulation supervisor in the black community for the Tuscaloosa Daily
before foimding the Tuscaloosa World. The Tuscaloosa World was published hy Scott
Syndicate, which also produced the Atlanta Daily World in Atlanta, Georgia. According
to his widow, Lancie Thomas, Frank had “a heart for civil rights and believed that as a
member of the media he would have an outlet for his ideas.”^* However, Thomas was
also outspoken, his candor often getting him in trouble with white leaders in Tuscaloosa
and sometimes blacks who disagreed with his imcompromising writing style. According
to Thomas:
It was this paper that got me my first real experience with the power stmcture and
in turn it caused me to become a target for a lynch mob. Because we felt that
some black [dudes] were getting a raw deal and there was no one at that time to
speak out for them, our newspaper attempted to do this, and for our efforts we
then became targets for the maddened mark leaders and many of us had to flee for
our lives.^’
Lancie Thomas, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 15 May 2002.
Frank P. Thomas, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project,
Mobile, Alabama, 4 August 1971.
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Fearing for his safety, Thomas fled to Montgomery, where he attended Alabama
Teachers College, now Alabama State University and foimd a job with a weekly black
newspaper, the Montgomery World From there, he traveled to Birmingham where he
worked for the Birmingham World. With the booming war-time economy in 1942,
Thomas decided to move to Mobile where he launched the Mobile Weekly Review, the
first black newspaper in the city to publish as a result of the expanded war economy in
the port city."*® According to Lancie Thomas, the Mobile Weekly Review was a regional
version of the Tuscaloosa Review that had been founded in the early 1930s/*
The Williams shooting coincided with Thomas’ move to Mobile. Shortly after he
came out in support of the proposed bus boycott, Thomas enlisted in the Navy. Although
he was not pressured to leave Mobile, Thomas believed that the social opportunities for
blacks to expand their horizons were far greater in the military. However, due to asthma,
which was not discovered imtil entering the military, Thomas received an honorable
discharge and moved his family North to Detroit, where according to Lancie Thomas, he
believed blacks faced less racial discrimination.'*^
In his absence, the Mobile Weekly Review was taken over by the Gulf Informer.
a subsidiary of the Mobile Press Forum Sun. After living several years in Detroit under
racial oppression that was sometimes more harsh than the conditions they had lived under
in the South, the Thomases returned to Mobile where fate, it seems, guided him back into
Ibid.
Lancie Thomas, interview with author, Mobile, Alabama, 15 May 2002.
42 Ibid.
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journalism. In 1954,1. H. Rhone, editor of the Gulf Informer, died. Thomas became the
editor of the Informer and changed its name to the Mobile Beacon, the moniker that it
carries to this day.**^ Thomas joined forces with men like LeFlore and the Beacon
emerged as the voice of Mobile’s civil rights movement. Through the Mobile Beacon.
the black community obtained the information that it needed to comprehend and tackle
the grave issues of racial inequality in Mobile. According to Thomas;
We feel that black life is as expensive as any other type of life jfrom any other
ethnic group. And what was happening in southern courts is this, especially in
Mobile and in many other southern communities. If a White is killed, then, of
course, the person who’s found guilty is either sentenced to death or they get a life
sentence or some long, heavy prison sentence. And our paper has worked on that
and we’ve editorialized on it and I think we’ve gotten some results. We’ve taken
the district attorney to task a number of times and they have called our office and
have tried to get in our good graces on this thing. And there are various other
issues that we have championed and we have not been afraid to editorialize on
them.'^
The meeting proved to be a significant first step to dealing with the issue at hand as
LeFlore, Thomas, Jackson, Rivers, Powell, Woolfe, and Carter put their names to a
petition endorsing the formation of an integrated committee to ensure that both black and
White workers cooperated to end the social inequities in Mobile.'*^ More importantly,
local leaders discussed a “walk-to-work, walk-to-church, and walk-to-shop” campaign
Ibid.
^ Frank P. Thomas, interviewed by Melton McLanrin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project,
Mobile, Alabama, 4 August 1971.
Mobile Register. “Racial Problems Under Discussion By Negro Leaders,” 24 August 1942.
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and drafted a statement to Byron E. Pickering, Superintendent of the National City
Lines, that spelled out the community’s recommendations.'*^
Determined to see considerable improvement in the conditions on Mobile’s buses,
LeFlore and others, demanded that the City Bus Line agree to seven conditions, which
were generously described as “recommendations.” A public announcement published by
the NAACP stated;
With regard to the many problems confronting the colored people who ride the
buses, the management courteously took the committee’s recommendations under
advisement and a definite decision in the matter is expected in a few days. In the
meantime, the Citizens Committee is holding in abeyance until Sunday, August
30*. Any and all procedure will be lawfully utilized in an effort to protect the
rights of colored citizens and avoid a recurrence of the tragic happening which
resulted in the death of an American solider on what appears to have been the
altar of race prejudice. You are urged to attend a special mass meeting at the
Metropolitan A.M.E. Church. It is your duty to be present.'*^
On August 24, 1942, the NAACP met with the black community to discuss the list of
recommendations to be presented to the National Bus Line and the city officials. Of
utmost concern was the excessive and arbitrary force used by white drivers. Black leaders
wanted the bus company to disarm all bus drivers immediately. Although it was legal for
drivers to carry gims, blacks realized that the weapons were rarely used for self-defense.
Rather, drivers used weapons to intimidate black passengers; Williams was a victim of
this practice. According to the NAACP, arming drivers only made them intolerant as
^Ibid.




well as resentful. Mobile's bus drivers, like those in other southern cities, were allowed
to carry weapons for protection. The National Bus Lines maintained that Mobile drivers
needed weapons to enforce the regulations set forth by the city. According to City Code,
“All conductors, or other employees, while in charge of cars/busses in the City ofMobile
and its police jurisdiction, are hereby vested with the power of police officers of the city
to carry out the provisions of this ordinance.” Next, black leaders insisted that the city
ordinances be applied impartially, that all patrons be treated invariably with the same
courtesy and that white drivers discontinue the abuse of unprovoked insults on blacks
using the transit system.*®
From the first days of the Mobile streetcar system, enforcement of the segregation
ordinances was lax. In most southern cities, a physical line separated black and white
riders. In 1902, New Orleans passed a segregation law that included a sliding partition to
separate the races. No such line existed in Mobile. Although black and white Mobilians
often sat in segregated seating from 1865 to 1902, Mobile did not have a municipal
ordinance separating the races. Local history also indicates that African Americans in
Mobile were indifferent to local segregated ordinances in transportation. In 1867,
Roderick B. Thomas stuimed the local community when insisting that he ride on a mule-
drawn trolley reserved for all-white passengers. Thomas’ censure led to a disturbance
^ Letter from John L. LeFlore to Byron E. Pickering, 25 August 1942, Branch Files, 1940-1955,
Series A, The South; Mobile Register. “Racial Problems Under Discussion by Negro Leaders,” 24 August
1942.
City Code ofMobile, 1937, Conductors Vested with Police Power, 758; City Code ofMobile,
1947, Police Power ofDrivers, 10-4; City Code ofMobile, 1955, Police Powers ofDrivers, 10-6.
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between blacks and whites who gathered around the incident. Thomas was arrested and
charged with inciting a riot and disorderly conduct. In 1902, a similar incident occurred
when an African American named John Samuel refused to sit in back of a streetcar.
Samuel was arrested and given the option of paying a $7.50 fine or spending fifteen days
in jail. No records exist on the outcome of the case. However, accounts do indicate that
some in the black community opted walking to their destination instead of riding the
Mobile trolley. On November 11, 1902, four black men assaulted another person
attempting to ride a local trolley. Perhaps because of the lack of support, the strategy was
banned after two months.^*
The 1937 Mobile Code of Ordinances stipulated that whites had to take vacant
seats from the front end of the car and that blacks had to take vacant seats from the rear.
Nothing precluded whites or blacks from occupying all vacant seats. Although blacks did
not sit with or in front ofwhites, legally blacks could sit in seats located in the front if all
the back seats were full. Thus “nothing shall prevent [NJegro persons from occupying all
of the seats of a bus; provided, that the [NJegro passengers take the rear vacant seats until
by so doing they fill all of the then vacant seats of the bus.^^
The same laws were applied when the Mobile transit system instituted the City
bus line. On routes that were all-black, Afiican-American patrons entered from the front
of the bus. Mobile’s blacks were angry because white drivers were compelling black
Mobile Register. “One man’s act ofdefiance long ago,” 8 December 2002.
”
City Code OfMobile, 1937, Regulations ofPassengers on Street Cars, 756,759.
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riders to give up their seats to white riders. Although the city bus line executives argued
that drivers had the authority to move commuters at will, the Mobile City Code
maintained that a driver could only move passengers to keep the races separate: “As
passengers leave the bus, the driver or other person in charge of the bus may assign
passengers to seats and require them to change seats so as to keep the races separated and
so as to utilize to the utmost the seating capacity of the bus.”^^ Nothing in the city code
required blacks to vacate their seats and stand; the committee insisted that the laws be
applied without preference to race. It was becoming commonplace for white drivers to
ignore this policy at the expense of the black passenger. Humiliated constantly by white
drivers, black patrons often watched operators bypass black people waiting at a stop in
favor of white people who were waiting. Frequently, a black patron would pay his fare
only to watch the bus driver leave before he could board. Black riders were also called
“monkeys” and “niggers” by bus drivers, which was the point of the fourth and fifth
recommendations.^'* This abuse lay at the core of the demand that city bus ordinances be
applied rigorously. No longer willing to tolerate such treatment, the leadership demanded
that the bus company respect its black customers.
The fifth recommendation required drivers to wear visible nametags. Although
wearing nametags would not prevent white drivers in Mobile fi’om verbally or physically
humiliating black passengers, the loss of anonymity would make it easier for customers
Ibid., City Code ofMobile, 1947, Occupancy ofail seats by persons of one race, 10-4, City
Code ofMobile, Occupancy ofall seats by persons ofone race, 1955, 10-7.
54 Ibid.
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to lodge complaints against the driver who had not treated them properly. The sixth
recommendation demanded that the bus company hire African-American drivers on
routes where there was a majority of black passengers. These routes included the Davis
Avenue-Highway 45 line and the Cedar Street-Davis Avenue route where Private
Williams had been killed. The NAACP and other community leaders believed that the
hiring of black drivers would reduce the friction between the black community and the
bus company. The NAACP argued that because the black community was necessary to
the financial success of the bus line, hiring black drivers would also serve the ends of
both constituencies.^^
Lastly, leaders insisted that Chandler, the driver who had killed Private Williams,
be fired. Blacks were horrified that he had been able to keep his job with the bus
company. According to the NAACP, Chandler’s continued employment constituted a
threat to black bus patrons, thus, he should be terminated. Given the fact that, violent acts
against blacks on the transit system were rarely persecuted, there was little incentive for
white bus drivers to resolve matters without using some type of force. Yet, Chandler
presented the black community with an even more difficult task. He was the first bus
driver to use deadly force, and by doing so, had set an ominous precedent. Chandler’s
imconscious act of murder deserved the bus line’s most strict form of punishment. As
55 Ibid.
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pointed out by the NAACP, bus employees who had committed lesser offenses had been
suspended/^ The NAACP was resolved in its position. The alternative to meeting the
community’s demands would be a boycott of all city buses. In a letter to the bus
company, the local NAACP emphasized its commitment to remedy the situation at all
cost. The correspondence stated:
After carefully considering this very critical and dangerous situation from all
angles, we appeal to take immediate steps to remedy it before other members of
our race become victims of violence. Unless this situation is rectified now we
have no alternative than to take whatever lawful action necessary for the
protection ofNegro citizens.
However, everyone agreed that the march should be postponed until the outcome of the
NAACP’s leadership conference with city officials.
After the meeting, a copy of the public aimoimcement attached to a memo
informed the national office that the African-American conununity was going to carry out
the protest if its demands were rejected. Roy Wilkins, Secretary of the national branch,
was informed that the community was already preparing to transport workers in private
means of transportation to and from their places of employment.^* Wilkins and the
national organization praised the black community in Mobile for their efforts to change
public transportation. Wilkins stated that “it was the feeling of the entire staff that you
should be told of our unqualified support for the work you are doing, and of our
^Mobile Register. “Bus Firm Agrees To Disarming ofSystem’s Drivers,” 1 September 1942,
LeFlore to Pickering, 16 October 1943, box 1, LeFlore Papers.
Letter to Byron E. Pickering from the NAACP, 26 August 1942, Box C3, Group 11, NAACP
Letter from LeFlore toWilkins, 1 September 1942, Box C3, Group II, NAACP Papers.
Papers.
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admiration for the manner in which you pressed the matter with firmness and
intelligence.”^^
On September 2, 1942, the NAACP capitalized on its organization’s efforts and
won a temporary victory. Superintendent Byron Pickering agreed to run a special bus for
black students attending the Mobile Training School.^® Finally, on September 6, the bus
company and city leaders met with black leadership to discuss their response to the
NAACP’s recommendations. National Bus Lines agreed to five of the leadership’s seven
demands. It agreed to (1) apply the segregation laws impartially, (2) to make their
drivers wear nametags, (3) to treat black riders with the same courtesy as White riders,
(4) to discontinue the abuse of xmprovoked insults to black patrons, and (5) to disarm all
drivers of their weapons. On the two weightier issues, firing Chandler and hiring black
bus drivers, company leaders promised to examine the matters at a later time.*^*
The black leaders received the information with mixed feelings and proceeded
with caution. With the exception of disarming bus drivers, a huge accomplishment, the
other concessions appeared only conciliatory. A follow-up meeting was called to make a
final decision. More than one thousand blacks attended to share their opinions of the bus
company's proposal. The black community was under no illusion that it had won, but it
did acknowledge that it was in a better position than were other major cities in Alabama.
” Letter fromNAACP to J.L. LeFlore, 10 September 1942, Branch Files, 1940-1955, Series A,
The South.
Mobile Re2ister. “Special Bus Planned forNegro Students,” 4 September 1942.
Mobile Register. “Mobile’s Colored People Call Off‘Walk’ Campaign,” 7 September 1942.
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Finally, the vote was taken and by a small majority, the black community agreed that the
National Bus Lines’ willingness to accept five of their seven demands and the promise to
address the other issues in the future constituted sufficient progress to make a bus
boycott unnecessary. Thus, the “Mobile bus boycott,” proposed almost thirteen years
before the Montgomeiy bus boycott, was called ofF.^^ LeFlore maintained that:
We have implicit faith that Mobile officials of the bus lines will carry out in full
accord their promise to take proper steps to rectify deplorable conditions affecting
colored bus patrons, and we certainly want to be fair and allow proper time for
fulfillment of the program. This is no retreat from our position, but merely a
desire to do that which we believe is right. We feel that tangible evidence of
improved conditions on the buses has been noted in the past few days and we
shall do our part in keeping faith.^^
Likewise, Roy Wilkins believed that the National Bus Lines now appreciated the clout
that black leaders in Mobile could muster in support of a cause, and would soon agree to
the remaining points. Wilkins wrote that, “We trust that further conferences with the bus
company will see the adoption of other recommendations.”^
Was the vote to call off the bus boycott a wise decision? Had the community
made the best choice? Had LeFlore and the NAACP failed the black community?
Blacks in Mobile, like blacks in Birmingham and nearby New Orleans, showed a great
“ Ibid.
“ Ibid.
^ Letter from NAACP to J.L. LeFlore, 10 September 1942, LeFlore Papers.
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amount of determination in attacking the injustices of their transit system.^^ Although the
murder ofWilliams provided the flash point for community action, the black community
approached the crisis with several advantages over most southern cities. First, in 1940,
AMcan Americans were hired to work on the transit board. Little information exists on
the roles these individuals played, but it was through the influence of the NAACP that
they were hired. Second, the segregation ordinance was one of the most progressive in
the South. The Williams shooting created an opportunity for the black community to tear
down some of the trappings of segregation. For instance, the black commimity demanded
that the ordinance on segregation, which already allowed them in the early 1940s to sit on
a first-come basis beginning in the rear of the bus, be applied impartially. They were
successful in getting the city bus line to agree to adhere to the ordinance, which led to
less arbitrariness in seating patterns.
Two other major challenges to segregated buses materialized in the South after
the abortive boycott in Mobile. The first was the bus movement in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana. The other was the well-known Montgomery bus boycott in 1955. The Baton
Rouge movement began in 1953, when the black community compelled the bus system to
adhere to a recent ordinance that allowed blacks to sit on a first-come basis, beginning at
the back of the bus. Similar to the incidents in Mobile, the Baton Rouge boycott was also
called off.
“ Robin D.G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture. Politics, and the Working Class (New York, Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1996), 17-76.
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The story of Rosa Parks has become a legend of the civil rights movement. On
December 1, 1955, she took a bus to go home after a long day on her feet, and sat down
in the neutral zone of the bus. She did not violate the segregation law until a white man
boarded the bus and, finding no vacant seat in the white section, ordered Mrs. Parks to
give her seat to him. She refused to comply and was arrested. In December 1955,42,000
black residents ofMontgomery began a yearlong boycott of city buses to protest racially
segregated seating. After 381 days of taking taxis, carpooling, and walking the hostile
streets ofMontgomery, blacks won their fight to desegregate seating on public buses, not
only in Montgomery, but also throughout the United States.
The planned bus boycott in Mobile and the Montgomery bus movement are
comparable in terms of their participants and outcome. First, in both cities, whites joined
the movement. In Mobile, Reverend H. E. Carter pastor of the Ann Street Presbyterian
church assisted the NAACP. In addition, this movement persuaded White Mobilians to
become NAACP members. Likewise, Rabbi Robert Gaetz, played a key role in the
Montgomery movement. These integrated groups were critical to the success of the
movements. Not only did whites, particularly white religious leaders, add to the
solidarity of these movements, their presence often provided those with whom they had
sought to negotiate, a sense of security. Whereas obstinate whites were unwilling to
negotiate with blacks on an even playing field, they were more likely to make
concessions when white religious community leaders spoke of their Christian and moral
obligations.
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A common theme among the three boycotts was the response from the white
community. White leadership in Mobile, Montgomery and Baton Rouge agreed to
improve their treatment of blacks. Nametags, less verbal abuse, and fairness in seating
were conceded. However, how did the white leadership in these various communities act
toward the more critical issues? In all three cities, white leadership refused to hire black
bus drivers (The Baton Rouge community never even asked.). In Montgomery, thirteen
years after the Mobile movement, white leadership still refused to grant that demand.
Realizing that whites in Montgomery were not going to compromise on that issue, Martin
Luther King and the Montgomery Improvement Association attempted to win a moral
victory by meeting on December 17, 1956, to request that the bus line only accept
applications with intent to hire black drivers when positions became available. Given
these circumstances, it can be postulated that blacks in Mobile had not acted prematurely
by calling off their boycott without this demand being met. By allowing this demand to
serve as a springboard for future progress and not as the determining factor for a boycott,
the Mobile community broke down more racial barriers in public transportation.
As far as segregation was concerned, the Baton Rouge community forced the bus
line to allow blacks to sit on a first come basis starting at the back of the bus. In Mobile,
the black community won that right more than a decade earlier. The Mobile movement
forced the bus line to uphold the ordinance without regard to race.
Finally, the planned bus boycott in Mobile should really be considered a
movement. The killing ofPrivate Henry Williams and its aftermath galvanized Mobile’s
“ Branch, Parting the Waters: America In The King Years. 1954-1963. 144.
47
black citizens and it became a textbook example of effective community activism.
Mobile’s black citizens, new-comers as well as natives, discovered the real value of
strong black leadership and civil rights organizations. The NAACP enjoyed a surge in
membership, and the involvement of white Mobilians showed that it was an organization
that was interested in the welfare of the entire community. Hence, the boycott
movement, forged an alliance among the NAACP, the black churches, and black labor.
With its rebirth, the NAACP entered an era of growth. Between late 1942 and
the spring of 1943, Mobile’s local chapter recruited more than 1,000 new members.^^ By
1944, more than 1,500 names were on its membership roster. There was also a growing
interest among White Mobilians to join the organization.^* Its goals also expanded. Prior
to the crisis between the bus company and the black community, the Mobile chapter of
the NAACP petitioned city officials and business leaders to offer the following services:
(1) improve services provided black patrons; (2) create equal accommodations for black
commuters; and (3) install limch counters, restrooms and water fountains for blacks in
local department stores.^^
The movement in Mobile had an outcome similar to that of the proposed March
on Washington in 1941. Asa Philip Randolph conceptualized the idea of a march on the
Letter from J.L. LeFlore to Lucille Black, Department ofBranches, 12 May 1943, LeFlore
Papers.
Letter from J.L. LeFlore to Mr. Walter White, Secretary ofthe NAACP, 21 October 1943,
LeFlore Papers.
^ Letter from John L. LeFlore to the Ministers of the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance and
the Baptist Ministerial Conferences, 19 November 1948, LeFlore Papers.
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nation’s capital in order to protest racial discrimination in the war industries and in the
military. The leaders of both events were prepared to take the next step if their demands
were ignored or rejected. The willingness of the other side to acknowledge the
legitimacy of at least some of the grievances of the black commimity made that next step
unnecessary.
However, neither Randolph nor LeFlore wanted to resort to direct action. Both
believed that they could make their case against legalized discrimination through
discussion. On the other hand, some critics believed that by settling for a partial victory,
Randolph and LeFlore sacrificed the long-term interests of their people. Nevertheless,
both movements were the precursors of the successful Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955-
1956 and the 1963 March on Washington.
The threat of a bus boycott showed Mobile’s blacks how to lay the groundwork
for future protests. Organized efforts by the NAACP and labor unions demanding better
jobs and working conditions led to national headlines when they forced the Alabama Dry
Dock and Shipbuilding Company (ADDSCO), one of Mobile’s largest employers, to
employ highly skilled black workers in 1943. Within days of their employment, these
workers were assaulted on the job by white co-workers who protested the elevation of
black workers to skilled positions alongside them. In 1944, the black community
mobilized against the Alabama Democratic Primary, and in 1946, they defeated the race-
based Boswell Amendment, which was designed to limit the voting power of black
citizens. Both campaigns grew out of the boycott movement. The bus movement also
primed blacks to take on Jim Crow even more aggressively. Although the bus ordinances
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remained unchanged over the next decade, blacks were less likely to acquiescence to
segregation laws. For instance. Mobile's seating ordinances, which permitted blacks to
sit from rear to front on an as needed basis often encouraged blacks in Mobile to ignore
segregation laws, even at the risk of reprisals. Another example was Marie Gayle, a
black Mobilian, who became involved in an altercation with Clarence J. McCain en route
to Prichard, Alabama.
By the late 1940s, blacks were no longer willing to vacate their seats and move to
the rear of the bus upon demand. During the mid-1940s, the local NAACP supported the
national effort to fight segregation in interstate travel and in January 1946 the local
branch, in tandem with the Marine and Steward Union, successfully defended a black
steward with whom a white seaman refused to sail.’* The most telling result of the 1942
protest was that Mobile became the first city in Alabama to hire black bus drivers.”
Finally, the Mobile bus boycott was the first mass protest to be laimched by
Mobile’s black community. The killing that prompted the black community into action
was a rare episode of bloodshed in the civil rights history of the city. Few other
movements of this era wielded such power. The tactics of the Mobile leaders were both
sophisticated for their time and amazingly successful. In Baton Rouge, Louisiana, blacks
organized along the same lines as did blacks in Mobile. The same can be said about
™ Louise Parker (native Mobilian, who rode the bus during this period), interview with author.
Mobile, Alabama, 5 December 2000.
Letter from John L. LeFlore to fellow citizens, 16 May 1946, LeFlore Papers.
^
Letter, “A Moment in Black History,” 2 February 1996, author unknown.
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Montgomery. Thus, the advanced seating model enforced in Mobile became the
blueprint that Martin Luther King, Jr., and the organizers of the Montgomery bus boycott
would adopt in 1955 and 1956.
CHAPTER TWO
JOHN L. LeFLORE AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, 1944-1956
This fight for the rights of black people during this particular period was no less
significant than the struggle of black people throughout our entire history in
America for a place in the sun, for a rightful place in the sun.
John L. LeFlore, Mobile, Alabama Undated
Introduction
Chapter Two examines the birth of the Mobile, Alabama, branch of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the career of John
LeFlore, one of the state’s most influential leaders. It discusses the Alabama Democratic
Primary in 1944, the return of World War 11 veterans, and their Negro Veterans Voters
League (NWL). These years also marked the era of the Boswell Amendment, the single
most important piece of political legislation hindering Afiican Americans in Alabama
since the 1901 Constitution that disenfi-anchised the black community. Mobile’s black
leadership was instrumental in abolishing Alabama’s all-white Democratic Primary.
Black leaders also organized to defeat the Boswell Amendment, which imposed a
rigorous and arbitrary literacy test on Afiican Americans as a precondition to voting.
Through its actions, the black community in Alabama increased voter participation and
raised the level ofpolitical awareness. The mobilization against the Boswell Amendment
drew national attention and became the political model for the enfi-anchisement of blacks
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throughout the state. Interestingly, in the tradition of most achievements by the black
community in Mobile, its accomplishments during this era were gained without violent
confrontation.
The cultural consciousness of the black community in Mobile was an example of
the significant impact ofWorld War I and post-war developments on African Americans.
Notable among these developments was the Harlem Renaissance that nurtured black
literary and artistic creativity during the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Harlem
Renaissance was not only a cultural watershed, but a movement which politically
empowered the black community throughout the nation. Although the Harlem
Renaissance was northern-based, its impact was felt in the south as well. By the mid-
1920’s, the NAACP expanded its membership and stepped up its campaigns against
numerous forms of racial discrimination including lynching which had a direct impact on
the south.
The vision of social justice for the black community came to fruition in Mobile in
1919. Established that same year to address the growing demand for social justice in the
community, the Mobile branch of the NAACP quickly became one of the most visionary
in the state. It initially exceeded the national criteria for local chapters in both
membership (104) and dues ($51).*
However, by the early 1920s most local branches in Alabama had been hounded
out of existence by the white supremacist groups that flourished in the state during the
‘ “Apportionment Payments to 1928 Inclusive” NAACP files, Library ofCongress, Washington,
D.C.; Dorothy Autrey, “Can These Bones Live? The National Association of the Advancement ofColored
People in Alabama, 1918-1930,” The Journal ofNegro History. 12 December 1997,3.
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early part of the twentieth century. These supremacy groups resurfaced to combat what
conservative whites viewed as a rising tide of social liberalism in America. Gender roles
were being challenged and blacks were becoming more socially and culturally conscious.
Mobile was no exception. In 1922, increased pressure by white militia groups led to a
sharp decline in the branch’s membership and dues. The lack of support led the national
branch to take corrective action, which included expelling the Alabama branches. By
1922, the local branch ceased to exist and the black community found themselves without
the support of any civil rights organization.
As race relations grew worse, several blacks pushed the national branch to
reinstate the NAACP charter. One such person was twenty-one-year old John L. LeFlore,
whose career as a community leader and civil rights activist would span fifty years. John
LeFlore, while not nationally recognized, was one of the most significant unsung heroes
of the black fi’eedom struggle in Alabama.
LeFlore was bom in Mobile on May 17, 1903, two years after the ratification of
Alabama’s Sixth Constitution that institutionalized a system of racial discrimination in
the state. LeFlore’s father worked for one of the local industries; he taught his family to
be industrious and brought them into the middle class. While he died when John was
only nine months old, his values would help shape the life of little John. LeFlore sold
newspapers at the age of ten and landed a job at the local shipyard at thirteen by claiming
to be sixteen.^
2
Documentary “ A Quiet Revolution; The Story of John LeFlore,” Musuem ofMobile, 3 March
1999.
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In 1920, LeFlore graduated from Owens Academy in Mobile, one of the few places
where black children in the city could receive a quality education. In 1922, he married
Teah Beck who helped him to rebuild a Mobile chapter of the NAACP. His relatively
privileged backgroimd did not distance him from the struggles of his people as evidenced
by the racial pride and sensitivity instilled by his family. He was keenly aware of other
African Americans who were less economically privileged and dedicated his life to
uplifting the black community in Mobile.
One incident had a particular impact on LeFlore’s political consciousness. While
sitting on the city’s rail in 1925 in downtown Mobile, LeFlore was accosted by a white
male patron who demanded that he vacate his seat and move to the back of the rail. Less
shocked than humiliated, LeFlore simply ignored him. By his own account, he would
have willingly given his seat to a woman out of genteel courtesy; but the fact that this
patron was an able-bodied man convinced LeFlore that the request to give up his seat was
based solely on race. His refusal to yield the seat led to a brawl, and both men were
arrested. An irate LeFlore believed that this type of bigotry was morally reprehensible
-3
and vowed to fight for radical social change.
Shortly after this incident, LeFlore began to reorganize the Mobile NAACP. On
August 24, 1926, a new local branch was approved and on September 23, 1926, it was
rechartered.'* The revived NAACP branch became the primary instrument for African-
American political activism. LeFlore rose quickly through the ranks of the organization,
^
Documentary “A Quiet Revolution” 1999; Autry, “Can These Bones Live? The NAACP 1918-
1930,” 12 December 1997, 8.
'' Application for Charter of Mobile, Alabama of the NAACP, undated, LeFlore Papers.
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serving as Executive Secretary of the branch for thirty years. His tenure would also
include chairing the Regional Conference of Southern Branches during the critical years
from 1936 to 1945. Later, LeFlore would function as vice president of the Alabama
Conference from 1945 to 1951.^
In 1956, the NAACP was outlawed in Alabama on the grounds that it had not
properly registered as an out-of-state organization. During this period, LeFlore and his
colleagues shifted their civil rights work to the Non-Partisan Voters League (NPVL).
LeFlore remained with the League even after the ban was lifted in 1964, and the Mobile
branch of the NAACP was reinstated.® In addition to his work with the NAACP, LeFlore
participated actively in other organizations for social change, including the Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters and the Mobile Committee for the Support of Public Education.
He was the first Afiican American appointed to the Housing Board and in 1974 was the
first African American elected to the Alabama House of Representatives for District 99
ofMobile County.
Similar to W.E.B. DuBois and his notions of the “Talented Tenth,” John LeFlore
also believed that relatively privileged blacks had a commitment to community uplift.
His keen intellect, determination, and selflessness allowed him to transcend community
differences and break through class barriers. For instance, LeFlore’s employment as a
* Unfortunately, the NAACP correspondence in the LeFlore papers does not begin until 1930, but
information about the early years of theMobile branch and Regional Conference may be found in the
NAACP papers at the Library ofCongress (Group 1, Series G, Branch File).
* John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970.
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postal worker was considered one of the more prestigious jobs open to a black person in
Mobile at that time.
LeFlore refused to take refuge in the relative safety and security that his social
position afforded him. His efforts to register black voters led to harassment and calls for
his resignation from the post office by administrators and other white leaders.’ John
LeFlore’s duties and responsibilities as a postal worker were under constant scrutiny.®
Rarely were other employees disciplined for similar alleged infractions, and most of the
accusations against LeFlore were unfounded. LeFlore was vocal about relentless
harassment; he even charged the department, city leaders, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) with discrimination.
According to the local historian Dorothy Autrey, LeFlore’s employers viewed his
comments as too incendiary for a federal employee. In 1941, the FBI fabricated charges
against LeFlore, claiming that he was an agitator and a communist. In addition, the
organization alleged that LeFlore had given assistance to blacks taking the civil service
examination.^ Once again, John LeFlore fought these charges and was exonerated.**^
Moreover, as a civil rights leader, LeFlore’s actions often exposed him to personal
threats. He narrowly escaped death or injury one night in 1953, when “divine intuition”
prompted him to leave an area of his house that was bombed seconds later. The Ku Klux
Klan also burned several crosses in his yard. Although LeFlore was not a student of
’Mobile Register, “Ask U.S. Probe Case ofLeFlore,” 6 February 1946.
*
Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution; The Story of John LeFlore,” 1999.
®Ibid.
The Afro American. “Foe ofSegregation May Lose P.O. Job,” 1 October 1955.
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Mahatma Gandhi, he embraced nonviolent direct action. Much like Martin Luther King
in Montgomery, “his ability to use soul force” motivated him and solidified his leadership
role in the Mobile community.
LeFlore used one-on-one negotiations with city leaders and avoided organizing
mass demonstrations. Although he was ready and willing to use whatever measures
necessary to bring about change, he believed that success would come more from
“talking than walking.”*^ Towards this end, he understood that without an organization,
the African-American community lacked the strength to negotiate social change. His
vision for a new Mobile convinced blacks in the city that participating in a vigorous civil
rights organization would bring them greater political and economic power.
Although LeFlore refused to limit his responsibilities to that of the state's branch
secretary, he, along with W. L. Bolden, B. G. Johnson, and Clarence Montgomery,
assumed much of the responsibility for most of the chapter's functions. He engaged in
the active recruitment of members, assisted in fundraising, and maintained a steady
correspondence with the national headquarters. He would investigate numerous alleged
crimes against African Americans, including cases of peonage, the rape of several black
women by a white man, and the head tax that was levied against blacks by the city
government.
"
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Gaining Access to Mobile’s Political Process: “Give Us the Ballot!”
With an increased political awareness in the aftermath of the planned bus boycott,
NAACP leaders stepped up their efforts to win enfranchisement for blacks in Mobile. In
addition to protesting the head tax, LeFlore led several Afiican-American leaders from
Alabama and Tennessee to encourage blacks to exercise their right to vote. Their efforts
caused a riot that resulted in the lynching of a black man. LeFlore spoke candidly about
his experience in Brownsville, Tennessee:
Whites just didn’t intend for the blacks to register and vote and every effort was
made to prevent them from doing it. At the time of my speaking engagement
there, the blacks were urged by me to register to vote, that in the ballot there was
power, power to rectify some the injustices that had been heaped upon blacks over
the years. The people took my advice. One man was actually lynched because of
the efforts by blacks to get registered to vote. And these others fled for their lives
to keep from being lynched in Brownsville because their only sin was they
wanted to vote.*'*
However, the fate of the local branch depended on the outcome of an ongoing battle by
southern blacks to abolish the Democratic Primary. The tide would turn in their favor in
1944, when the United States Supreme Court abolished a similar Democratic primary in
Texas. In a case known as the Allwright decision, the cornerstone of black
enfranchisement in the South was built.
The Democratic Primary in Alabama was based on a long history of political
discrimination. Participation in the electoral process for the Afiican American in the
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970.
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South was partially realized in the 1870 Constitutional Amendment, which granted voting
rights to black men. Following the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, blacks
throughout the South went to the polls to take advantage of their inalienable right to vote.
Remarkably, during Reconstruction, over 600 black men were elected to public office.
Although the impact of their positions was minimal, the black vote influenced the
outcome ofmany local, state and national elections.
This was particularly true in Alabama. The 1870 Alabama census counted
521,384 whites and 475,510 blacks. These figures showed that nearly twice as many
blacks as whites were registered to vote: 114,704 blacks and 53,409 whites. Conscious of
their growing political clout, black voters turned out to be the deciding factor in the
organization of Alabama’s Constitutional Convention.*^ Conversely, as blacks began
participating in the democratic process, White conservatives worked to disfranchise them.
Although by the early 1900s Alabama had over 120,000 black men who met the legal
requirements, the number of registered black voters dwindled to just over 3000.*^ The
timid pledges of racial cooperation that materialized in the Populist Era were rescinded,
particularly in Alabama where rigid segregation and legalized inequality were already
facts of life.*’ Hence, to the chagrin of blacks in Alabama, the Sixth Constitution of
Alabama, enacted in 1901 gave white Alabamians the right to exercise the vote while
** William Warren Rogers, Robert David Ward, Leah Rawls Atkins, and Wayne Flint, Alabama:
The History ofA Deep South State (Tuscaloosa; University ofAlabama Press, 1994), 244.
Henry Allen Bullock, A History ofNegro Education in the South: From 1619 to the Present
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 191.
’’WilliamWarren Rogers, Robert David Ward, Leah Rawls Atkins and Wayne Flint, Alabama:
The History ofA Deep South State (Tuscaloosa: University ofAlabama Press, 1994), 244.
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withholding it from blacks. This type of legislation forced blacks out of organized party
politics throughout the first halfof the twentieth century.
Southern Democrats capitalized on their constitutional conventions by further
tampering with voting laws to create what became known as the “all-white” Democratic
Primary. Blacks opposed the primary and in the 1920s gained an upper hand in the
Nixon V. Herndon decision, whereby the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the exclusion
ofAfiican Americans from a Texas primary. Moreover, in Nixon v. Condon, the NAACP
successfully countered a measure by the Texas Democratic Party to fix the qualifications
for party membership when it called for the party’s executive committee to be declared
unconstitutional. However, much of the ground gained by the NAACP was lost in the
1935 Grovey v. Townsend decision when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to outlaw the
exclusion of Afiican Americans in Texas when an exclusionary resolution was adopted
I ft
by the state convention.
The brutal discriminatory practices set in motion by the Democratic Primary were
a stark reminder that whites in Alabama had made segregation the foundation of social
life in the state. Mobile’s civil rights activist, Wiley L. Bolden, who worked alongside
LeFlore, accurately claimed that the Democratic Party, made up ofmostly “Dixiecrats,”
was known as the “white party” by blacks in Mobile. According to Bolden,
[in May 1944], it must be remembered that the Democratic Party ofAlabama had
been operating under the caption that [it was] a white party ... the white
Seven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South. 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979), 47-49.
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Democratic Party, a private party, so that the action of the committee was in
keeping with what they had [done] for years.
Dixiecrats were politically conservative southern whites who wanted to create a political
machine that would be accountable only to itself. In Alabama, they were willing to
weaken the Democratic Party as a whole in order to eliminate the black vote. They
dreamed of creating a selection process that would be beyond challenge, even by the state
government. The result of such a prejudicial selection process led to an all-white party
that silenced the voice of blacks in Alabama.^® As an all-white party, it initiated
measures such as the cimiulative poll tax, literacy exams, and other means to disfranchise
individuals they considered to be potentially dangerous to the status quo.
While these measures sometimes disfranchised poor whites, their key purpose was
to keep African Americans from voting. The cumulative poll tax was a hefty $1.50 per
year, and it was collected every year from everyone between the ages of twenty-one and
forty-five. The NAACP leadership attacked this discriminatory voting procedure. John
LeFlore led the fight. He stated:
If you waited until you were forty of fifty to get registered to vote, you had to pay
a retroactive poll tax back to your twenty-first birthday, although between twenty
one and forty eight or fifty years of age you made no attempt to vote. All of this
was a remaining part of the so called Black Codes that had been adopted by most
John L. LeFlore and Wiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, Undated.
Carl Grafton and Anne Pennaloff, Big Mules and Branchheads: James E. Folsom and Political
Power in Alabama (Athens, GA: University ofGeorgia Press, 1985), 79-80; McLaurin’s Oral Interview
with Leflore and Bolden, Undated.
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of the southern states after Reconstruction for the purpose of almost re-enslaving
blacks.^ ^
Eventually, LeFlore became involved with the National Committee to Abolish the
Poll Tax. The purpose of this tax was to preclude the black vote from penetrating the
22
white primary. In many instances, blacks in Mobile could not pay the poll tax.
Paradoxically, the party did allow a few blacks, mostly from Birmingham, to vote in the
primary. LeFlore believed that these blacks had been hand-picked because they supported
“y'i
the goals of white separatism in Alabama. Not only did they represent token
enfranchisement, they were used as official spokesmen of the black community. This
tactic overshadowed the real concerns of African Americans in Alabama and divided
some black leaders.
Still, the majority of African Americans who paid the poll tax voted Republican
and to a lesser degree. Independent. Ironically, in Alabama, the Republican Party had
proven to be just as insensitive to black voters as the Democratic PartySince the
Republican Party suffered continued losses throughout the twentieth century in Alabama,
the Democratic Primary determined most state races. Alabama did not elect its first
Republican governor until the 1980s. LeFlore maintained that winning the primary was
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972; Harold H. Buckles to John L. LeFlore, 24 November 1945, LeFlore Papers; The
National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax, LeFlore Papers, 24 February 1948, LeFlore Papers.
^ Mobile Press Register. “Black/White Mobile” 1990,3.
^ John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project,
Mobile, Alabama, 9 October 1972.
^^Ibid.
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equal to winning the election because the Republican Party had no particular strength in
the South?^
The Democratic Party in Alabama consisted of 72 state members, 2,500 county
members, and 14,000 general election officials?® The chairman of the party was ultra¬
conservative attorney Gessner McCorvey of Mobile. McCorvey epitomized the
Southern white politician, determined to maintain control over black citizens. As leader
of the Alabama party, McCorvey dedicated his legal skills to keeping blacks in Alabama
disfranchised. He believed that he could do so by keeping an enfeebled Democratic Party
strong. According to McCorvey, the party declined because the rank-and-file fervently
on
resisted any intrusion from the national party when it came to issues of race.
McCorvey rejected any outside pressure to change the goals of the Alabama Dixiecrats,
insisting that white leaders in Alabama knew what was best for the party. His goal was to
eliminate the black vote and dominate the Alabama electoral process. As a key player on
Mobile’s Board of Registrars, he helped to set the agenda. The board had unlimited
power over voter eligibility. Through such devices as the poll tax, literacy test and
imderstanding clause, it sought to disfranchise black voters. Thus, failure to read well
enough was groimds for disfranchisement. The literacy requirement and other devices
“Ibid.
“ Davis V Schnell, Civil Action No. 758, 7 January 1949, 1.
Melton McLaurin, “Mobile Blacks and WorldWar II: The Development of a Political
Consciousness.” GulfCoast Politics in the Twentieth Century (Pensacola, Fla., 1973), 7.
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similar to it imposed tremendous psychological burdens on African Americans. The
political bearing of the Allright decision was driven home to black leadership in the South
by efforts ofThurgood Marshall, then special council for the NAACP. He stated:
We have carefully gone over the decision in the Texas Primary case and are
convinced that the decision authorizes the voting of Negroes in all primary
elections both federal and state. There is no doubt that in some instances Negroes
will be denied the right to vote despite this ruling by the United States Supreme
Court. Will you therefore see to it that qualified Negro electors present
themselves to the polls for voting in the primary election and if refused, please
have them make out affidavits as to the refusal and send them to this office."
Because of his frequent correspondence with the Mobile Branch, Marshall developed a
close working relationship with John LeFlore. Marshall kept the Mobile branch abreast
of national civil rights issues. He also provided them with guidance and leadership.
Convinced that the Allwright decision was critical to eliminating black disfranchisement,
Marshall contacted the Mobile branch about preparing a strategy for that city. LeFlore
believed the Allright decision had the potential to reform politics in Alabama, and he led
•31
the NAACP efforts to abolish the state’s Democratic Primary.
Following the Allright decision, the Mobile NAACP appealed to local, state, and
national representatives in numerous letters emphasizing the need to end discrimination
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972; Undated; LeFlore to Attorney Generial Tom C. Clark, 23 Januaiy 1946,
LeFlore Papers.
^ Marshall to Branches in areas affected by the Texas Primary decision, 8 May 1944, LeFlore
Papers.
“ LeFlore to Marshall, 2 October 1945, LeFlore Papers; LeFlore to Marshall, 15 May 1945,
LeFlore Papers; LeFlore to Marshall, 5 January 1948, LeFlore Papers. John L. LeFlore, interviewed by
Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile, Alabama, 9 October 1972.
John L. LeFlore andWiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral
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in the electoral process in Alabama. Leaders also emphasized the role of the black
community in gaining voting rights. They stressed the fact that the rights of over 900,000
blacks in the state were being jeopardized when they were barred from casting ballots;
that investigators working on behalf of the NAACP discovered at least nineteen cases of
voter discrimination; and that the community needed to provide financial support to end
discrimination in government. According to the NAACP,
The rights of more than 900,000 Negroes in Alabama were affected when
members of the colored group were not permitted to vote on May 21. The
NAACP has established at least nineteen (19) cases of political disfinnchisement
right here in Mobile and, with your support, will meet the challenge to a
democratic way of life at the polls in the courts. We must have $10,000 within
the next two weeks for the vote cases and a vocational training discrimination
case now before us. One involves your right to participate in your government as
a citizen, and the other is of relative importance to your right to procure training
and employment as a skilled worker. It will take money, and quite a bit of it, to
carry through the courts these fights for you and all other Negroes of our State
and Country. We must have no slackers! The fight is too important to lose
because of an attitude of indifference toward the principles of the cases. We
claim we want liberty, fairness and justice, so let us prove to the world that we are
willing to give for these causes.”
Several weeks before the first Democratic Primary following Allright, local
leadership met to discuss viable ways of bringing their struggle to national attention.
First, with the help of Thurgood Marshall, they decided that on Election Day, May 2,
1944, twelve qualified African Americans would attempt to vote.^^ Next, they invited
Life and Time magazines to the city to cover the event.^'* As Martin Luther King, Jr. and
“An Emergency Appeal to the Citizens ofMobile,” 16 May 1944, LeFlore Papers.
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972; McLaurin’s Oral Interview with LeFlore and Bolden, Undated.
34 Ibid.
66
other civil rights leaders would do in the 1950s and 1960s, Mobile’s local NAACP
strategically used the press to champion their cause. As a correspondent for the Chicago
Defender and the Pittsburgh Courier. LeFlore had seen firsthand the potential power of
the media to shape public opinion. Carefully planned by the NAACP, the publishers
agreed on the eve of the primary to take pictures throughout the process.^^
As planned, on the day of the election, twelve registered African American voters
made their way to the polls to vote. All were summarily denied access by the Mobile
Board of Registrars. In the case of James B. Battle, Deputy Sheriff Frank Pryor stood in
the doorway leading to the canvassing room and informed Battle that he could not enter
because the Democratic Primary election was being held for white voters only. An
African-American bystander voiced his frustration at the Board’s actions: “I guess that
means that a black person doesn’t get to vote.”^^
Life deployed a cadre of photographers to cover the event. Several photographs
showed the Mobile Board denying blacks the right to vote. In 1944, Time made the
incident its cover story. These images captured the attention of blacks stationed in the
armed forces throughout the United States, Europe, and the Pacific. Through these
images, LeFlore and the NAACP demonstrated the hypocrisy of African Americans
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October, 1972.
Elliot Battle, Affidavit, 1945, LeFlore Papers.
” John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 12 October 1972.
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having to fight for democracy abroad while being denied the right to vote at home. In
a 1970 interview, LeFlore emphasized the point that the press coverage was probably one
of the most important reasons for the Department of Justice (DOJ) challenging the
Democratic Primary in Alabama. He stated:
Life Magazine was distributed to men in the armed forces throughout the world in
the European theater ofwar as well as the theater war in the Pacific. We believed
that it may have been an important factor in having the Department of Justice take
such prompt steps to challenge this sort of situation which proscribed the rights of
black Americans to participate in a primary for the election of the to officials who
would control the destiny ofall the people.^^
In addition, the NAACP had all twelve of the people who had been denied ballots
to file petitions of discrimination with DOJ. The affidavits were filed through the Office
of Francis Biddle, Attorney General. Biddle promised to take action against the state for
violating the federal rights of American citizens.'*® Biddle’s annoimcement brought a
sigh of relief to Mobile’s NAACP as black leaders anticipated a milestone in voting
rights for Afiican Americans in Alabama.
However, the relief was short-lived. In April of 1944, President Franklin
Roosevelt died, and Biddle, who had vowed to challenge states’ rights in discrimination
cases, was replaced by Tom Clark. Clark, a Southerner from Texas, promised to
Ibid.
John L. LeFlore andWiley Bolden, interviewed byMelton McLaurin, inMcLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, Undated.
^ John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970.
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eliminate the primary, but allowed the southern states to do so at their own speed.'”
Without pressure from the attorney general’s office to act expeditiously, Alabama’s
legislators moved at a snail’s pace to give themselves time to come up with a piece of
counter legislation.
Disappointed by the dilatory process, the NAACP submitted several letters to
federal officials and to Marshall complaining about the lack of assistance being provided
by the DOJ. Marshall was informed that African-American voters were still being denied
the right to vote and that several black voters had filed suit against the Board. LeFlore
added that DOJ was indifferent to their request to end the all-white Democratic Primary,
and that the African-American community was ready to take more drastic measures.'*^ At
this point, LeFlore and others moved beyond negotiating with local leadership and were
in the process oforganizing a mass protest in the black community in Mobile.
With pressure mounting, including the NAACP gearing up to protest the poll tax,
McCovery, introduced several bills designed to circumvent the negative impact of
eliminating the Democratic primary. The most formidable of these was the Boswell
Amendment, drafted by State Senator E.C. “Bud” Boswell. McCorvey presented the
Amendment to the state legislature for approval in November 1945. He and other
Democratic leaders were convinced that this Boswell Amendment would have an even
more debilitating impact on African-American enfranchisement rights than the
Democratic Primary.
LeFlore to Marshall, 28 November 1945, LeFlore Papers.
LeFlore to Marshall, 2 October 1945, Leflore Papers; LeFlore to Clark, 23 January 1946,
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The NAACP leadership was convinced that the Boswell Amendment was
devised by white racists and would, if adopted, be the ultimate strategy by the
Democratic Party in Alabama to defy the court’s ruling on the Democratic Primary/^
The basic tenets of the proposed Amendment expanded the already discriminatory voting
rights legislation utilized by the state through its Democratic Primary. A common ploy
throughout the South, the Boswell Amendment was designed to restore ultimate authority
of the electoral process to local registrars, which to many blacks, was a covert way of
permanently “fixing” the registration process.
Whereas the Democratic Primary had enforced the cumulative poll tax and
literacy test, the Boswell Amendment sought to make the process totally subjective,
placing Afiican Americans at the complete discretion of biased voting boards."*^ A
tendentious and racist piece of legislation, it read in part:
After the first day of January, nineteen hundred and forty-six, the following
persons, and no others, who, if their place of residence shall remain unchanged,
will have, at the date of the next general election, the qualifications as to residence
prescribed in Section 178 of this article, shall be qualified to register as electors
provided they shall not be disqualified under Section 182 of the this Constitution:
those who can read and write, understand and explain any article of the
Constitution of the United States in English language."^^
The NAACP leadership concluded that Boswell would create a permanent caste
for blacks that would totally eliminate them firom the electoral process. LeFlore
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972.
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maintained that the requirements were purely hypocritical and that if the amendment was
passed, the voters of Alabama would have to possess more knowledge than most
Americans citizens, including those who sat on the Supreme Court. He also believed an
amendment with such rigid educational requirements and the tactic to place the final
decision in the hands of a racist Board ofRegistrars were both unjust.'*^ NAACP leaders
were accurate in their assessment. Members of the Board publicly admitted to asking
blacks almost every conceivable question before being turned away on some bogus
technicality.'*^
The NAACP emphasized that Boswell, himself, could not adequately answer
questions to the satisfaction of a group of Constitutional experts.'** The sentiments of
these jurists were later echoed by several of Alabama’s Court Justices who maintained
that to understand and to explain the Constitution was legally ambiguous, uncertain and
indefinite in meaning. The Amendment failed to specify the level of satisfaction the
applicant had to meet, or whether the Constitution be explained partially, fully, plainly,
precisely, correctly, fairly, or reasonably. Nor did the Amendment indicate whose
standards the applicant had to meet, set no standardized criteria whereby an objective
board could determine if the applicant’s rights had been honored. Even the fi’amers of the
^ John L. LeFlore and Wiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, inMcLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, undated; By-Laws for Southern Conference for Human Welfare,
undated, LeFlore Papers.
Davis V Schnell, 4; John L. LeFlore andWiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in
McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile, Alabama, undated.
Davis V Schnell, 6; By-Laws for Southern Conference for human Welfare, Undated, LeFlore
Papers.
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Constitution and Supreme Court Justices had disagreed over the meaning of the
Constitution.'^^
Joseph Langan and the White Moderates’ Push for Black Equality
By the mid-1940s a growing number of white moderates began to make their
views known around Alabama. Although these individuals did not unanimously advocate
elimination of Jim Crow, they were convinced that America needed to reconsider the
status of race relations. Their reasons incorporated both morality and practicality. First,
they often supported the claim that citizenship should outweigh race. On the other hand,
moderate whites feared what would happen if the “New Negro” sought equality outside
of the confines of the traditional patterns of segregation.
Some moderates shifted legitimate black dissatisfaction into constructive
channels. As a result, moderate white leaders often sought to organize functioning
interracial groups, composed of moderate white leaders or “responsible” black leaders,
which would seek solutions to Negro problems within the legal fi-amework. These
leaders initially believed that they could maintain racial harmony by moving toward
social equality within the system of segregation.*® The significance of this group caimot
be underestimated. As the movement progressed, this group helped to make it possible
for blacks to achieve their goals.
Davis V Schnell, 6.
“ Melton McLaurin, “Mobile Blacks and World War II: The Development ofa Political
Conscious” 47.
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The white moderates in Alabama rejected the premise of the Boswell
Amendment, referring to it as antidemocratic and un-American. This group was led by
Joseph Langan who became one of the most visible white advocates for civil rights in the
state. Langan was bom in Mobile in 1912 and matriculated in the Mobile County public
school system. He began practicing law in 1935 and in 1938 his passion for politics led
him to pursue public office. Eventually elected as a State Representative, Langan was
only one of three representatives fromMobile.
Langan was instrumental in the reorganization of many of Alabama’s state
agencies, including industrial relations, finance, and transportation-in addition to
creating a merit system for government employees that allowed black workers to gain
access into the to public jobs. Langan also oversaw the passage of local legislation,
which led to amerit system and voting machines for Mobile County.
In 1940, Langan served in the Alabama National Guard and was called to serve as
a captain commanding the headquarters company of the 31®* division. In the military, he
grew to know and respect black soldiers. By his own admission, he had fought side-by-
side with blacks during World War II and admired how they had fought for a country that
would not give them a job or let them drink from the same water fountain.^* According
to Langan,
Well, I believe that blacks certainly [had the right to be involved in politics]-
because there had been many of them in the armed forces with us. Matter of fact,
I had served with a nxunber of them at different times overseas. I had many of
the units that they manned in parts ofmy command. And—^when many of them
Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 12 October 1972; Documentary “A Quiet Revolution: The Story of John LeFlore,” Museum of
Mobile, 3 March 1999.
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came back, they certainly expected and had a right to expect as citizens of the
United States the right to full citizenship and the privileges that we feel are
important being an American citizen/^
Upon his return to the South, Langan took note of how the racial changes had
worked to divide Mobile. He particularly noticed the inequality in public transportation.
One incident in Mobile caught his attention and pushed him into the civil rights
movement. While riding on a bus to the state house, the white driver intentionally passed
stops where blacks were standing but stopped to pick up whites several blocks away. The
incident so outraged him that he wrote a letter to the local newspaper condemning the
actions of the bus driver. According to Langan, such incidents were unjust, particularly
to those who had fought valiantly to protect the nation.
Langan was particularly close to a number of African-American veterans in
Mobile. As Commander of the local branch of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), he
believed that blacks were entitled the same respect as whites and he maintained,
emphatically, that they be treated as equal citizens in Mobile. Langan encouraged black
veterans in Mobile to charter organizations to help them achieve their civil rights. One of
the first groups he helped to organize was the African-American chapter of the VFW in
1947. Langan participated in this group’s efforts to attack discrimination in the city.
A devout Catholic, he believed that the first priority of a person should be his
relationship with God. Referring to the freedom as the single most important blessing
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970; Joseph Langan, interview with author, Mobile, Alabama, 22 November 1999.
“ Ibid.
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imder the American system of government, he emphasized that all Americans had the
inherent right and obligation to be involved in the government, specifically the electoral
process. To Langan, good government was related to voting. He believed that all
Americans had civil rights and he supported efforts to abolish discriminatory laws.^"*
Deepening his commitment to the enfranchisement of all Americans was the fact that
during the Truman election, the Dixiecrats attempted to deny Langan and other whites the
right to vote during the primary.^^ Again, their goal was to disqualify black voters.
Mobile made more social progress under Langan’s leadership than it did under the
leadership of any other official. His efforts led to the peacefiil de-segregation of the
Mobile library system, the local railroad terminal restaurant facilities, the bus system, and
public parks and playgroimds.^^ According to Mobile civil rights leader O. B. Purifoy,
“We had Joseph Langan. Blacks in Birmingham had no such person, so they had to
march and demonstrate before anybody would listen.”^^ Eventually, Langan joined
hands with several other senators from Alabama to filibuster the Boswell Amendment in
the Senate. These senators spent several days trying to defeat the Amendment, but
simply wore out from fatigue.^*
^Ibid.
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VromAUwright to Boswell: The Decisive Triumph
Despite opposition, the Alabama legislature adopted the Boswell Amendment in
November 1945. Alabama voters would make their final decision in the general election
on November 7, 1946. Still, the impact was immediate. By January 1946, over 19,000
Mobilians had registered to vote, but only 275 of those registered were Afiican
Americans. Convinced that the eventual passage of the Boswell Amendment, which had
the support of the legislative leadership, would more than compensate for the elimination
of the all-white Democratic Primary, the Alabama Democratic Executive Committee
agreed to abolish the primary and open its doors to all “qualified voters.” On January 12,
1946, McCorvey met with the Committee in Montgomery to declare that all racial
barriers against blacks in the Alabama Democratic Primary be dropped immediately.^’
Although the Boswell Amendment had not been ratified by the voters, the
adoption of the Amendment served as a strong reminder to the black community in
Mobile and throughout die state that voting on an equal basis with whites would be an
uphill battle. In some instances, a striking parallel was made between the labor
movement, which most blacks favored, and black enfi-anchisement. Emory O. Jackson of
the Birmingham World likened the Amendment to the Bradford Act which prohibited the
closed shop in labor unions. According to Jackson, the two bills made up a two-edge
” John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972.
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sword that the enemies of trade unions, working under the smoke screen of “white
supremacy,” would attempt to use to cmsh the labor movement in Alabama.
As the Mobile NAACP launched a campaign against the ratification of Boswell at
the state level, members continued to protest the unfair treatment of local blacks by the
Mobile Board of Registrars. Again, Mobile’s NAACP informed the DOJ about the
Constitutional violations by the Mobile Board of Registrars. This time, though, they
requested that prompt action be taken against the various cases of voter discrimination.
The NAACP informed:
The action of the Mobile County Board of Registrars in imposing unlawful
requirements upon Negro citizens who desire to become qualified electors is, in
our opinion, in violation of the Constitution of the United States. We urge the
Department of Justice to promptly investigate the charges referred to in this
message, which we have found evidence to substantiate.^*
Furthermore, LeFlore informed DOJ by telephone that white leaders in Mobile
had done nothing to deal with the problem of discrimination in voter registration. On 29
January, Mobile’s NAACP informed DOJ of several more cases where whites were
allowed to complete registration forms but blacks were rejected because they failed to
read certain sections of the Constitution to the satisfaction of the local board.^^ The
NAACP letter to the Alabama Public Service Commission, “Emory O. Jackson, Editor of the
Birmingham World. 1 December 1945.
LeFlore to Attorney General Tom G. Claric, 23 January 1946, LeFlore Papers.
“ LeFlore to Assistant General L. Caudle, 29 January 1946, LeFlore Papers.
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Department of Justice responded to the complaints in a timely manner, requesting that
local officials examine the matter and deal appropriately with any violators.^^
Even more devastating to blacks in Mobile was that the state’s Dixiecrats had
created voting loopholes between the adoption and ratification of the Boswell Amend¬
ment. Milton Schnell, chairman of the Mobile Board of Registrars, colluded with
members of the Board to preserve its quota system until the ratification of the Boswell
Amendment. Schnell encouraged his staff to use this system regardless of the number of
black voters appearing at the polls.
As expected, this approach prevented most blacks fi-om registering. Only
fourteen to fifteen blacks a day were allowed to register. Again, the NAACP filed
affidavits with the DOJ offering proof that illiterate whites were being helped to complete
the application process, while blacks were intentionally denied.^ This time the NAACP
denounced Schnell and McCovrey as racist and corrupt for ignoring the United States
Constitution.^^
Organizing the Grassroots: Jasper J. Thomas and the Negro Veterans Voters
League
The commitment to voting rights drew the attention of new interest groups. One
of the most notable of these groups was the Negro Veterans Voters Association (NWA).
“ LeFlore to Kenneth Smith, 31 January 1946, LeFIore Papers.
^ The Montgomery Advertiser “Let’s Face lt,”“, February 1946; John L. LeFlore Affidavit, 3
April 1946, LeFlore Papers.
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Like the NAACP, the NWA labored for the full enfranchisement of African
Americans.^^ The NWA supported the changes that were taking place in Mobile.
During the mid-1940s, the citizens of Mobile began experiencing a heightened sense of
injustice when black servicemen and women began returning from the battlefields of
World War H. These people showed little inclination to accept the racial status quo any
longer. Veteran James Jackson, Jr. maintained that with good humor and ready hands,
African Americans had carried their share of the burdens in the war for the liberation of
oppressed peoples. According to Jackson,
Blacks fought in every theater, toiled as hard as White soldiers, and died. One in
every ten men who answered the country’s call was black. Black soldiers passed
ammunition from sinking ships on the beaches ofNorth Africa, Italy and France
to the cacophony of chattering machine guns from stukas screaming low over our
heads. We carved a piece of road out of the sheer sides of motmtain peaks and
through a steaming jungle fattened on monsoon rains. And when a convoy of the
winged sons ofNippon came nosing out of the clouds [to] lay eggs on the road,
one of us leaned onto a bucking 50-rtun and shot one down. This was India and
Burma. We did our part. Now, forever a part of the soil of Asia, of Europe, of
African, and of all the oceans of the earth, we are tired of the dirt and the dangers
and the loneliness and we want and dream of the peace, the security and the
warmth of fiiendly smiles, the home feeling of belonging and being wanted; the
amenities of the American democratic heritage in our hometowns down South.^^
Such expressions inspired the “New Negro.” Many in the Afiican-American community
sought changes through new and innovative forms of protest and new grass roots
organizations, fueling the spirit of black protest. Integrating public accommodations.
**
Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
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transportation, public education, and the civil service became priorities for the Black
community. The NVVA was championed by Mobilian, J. J. Thomas.
Thomas was bom in Whistler, Alabama, on December 25, 1888. His educational
experiences included studies in England and Africa where he learned architecture.
Thomas designed The Thomas Building, one of the largest buildings on Davis Avenue
where most of Mobile’s African-American businesses were located. The building had
twenty-six rooms on two floors and included spaces for his office, a restaurant, beauty
shop, T.V. shop, and rooms for out-of-town visitors. He also supervised the construction
of one of the largest housing projects for blacks in Mobile, the Hillsdale Heights
community.^*
Similar to Langan, Thomas quickly identified with the veterans returning from the
war and insisted that blacks initiate action against inequalities. His motto, “A voteless
people is a hopeless people,” led him into the heart of the political movement in Mobile.
The naming of the veterans organization marks one of the traly fascinating stories of
Mobile’s African-American history. According to legend, one day Thomas dreamed of
three letters WA. This vision came to him on several occasions, but at the time he did
not understand the reason. His search for meaning would end when he learned about the
Boswell Amendment in the local newspaper. This anecdote reveals what Thomas
considered a divine calling to fight black oppression. By the end of the 1940s, the role
that the Negro Veterans Voting Association played in the movement for black
enfranchisement overshadowed that of the NAACP and Thomas, a rising political star
^ Paulette Davis-Horton, The Davis Avenue Story (Mobile: Horton, Inc., 1991), 364.
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who gained national attention, temporarily rivaled LeFlore as Mobile’s most influential
black leader.®^
Many of the individuals that the NAACP sought to register in the 1946
Democratic Primary were veterans. However, instead of challenging the voting issue
through the NAACP, they reorganized under the leadership of J.J. Thomas. This group
denounced the discriminatory practices of Mobile’s Board of Registrars and, like the
NAACP, called for blacks to immdate the local board with qualified applicants. Such
steps taken by the NAACP and the fledgling NWA led to an immediate jump in voter
registration. While there were only 276 African-American voters in January 1946, by the
end of the year there were over 1300 voters on the rolls.’”
Despite the increase in voters, the real task for blacks in Mobile remained the
repeal of the Boswell Amendment. Local branches and leaders throughout Alabama
began examining ways to block the final passage of the bill. Led mainly by their local
NAACP, Birmingham and Montgomery debated the constitutionality of Boswell and
recruited blacks to challenge the system. In Mobile, the NAACP and the NWA
campaigned heavily against white conservatives who ran a campaign that portrayed
African-Americans in Alabama as subhuman and unfit to vote.”
One notable opponent of the Boswell Amendment was Governor-Elect, Jim E.
Folsom, who argued that it was undemocratic and could lead to discrimination not only
™ Mobile Press. 19 January 1947,1 February 1947.
John L. LeFlore andWiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, Undated.
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against Negro voters but to some white voters as well. Outspoken on the matter, Folsom
emphasized that the impact of Boswell would eventually lead to a small minority
controlling state politics. Folsom, perhaps deliberately emulating the late President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, used foeside chats that were broadcasted over the airwaves to
Alabama voters on the evils of the Boswell Amendment.
Finally, eighty members of Alabama’s clergy, speaking on behalf of the
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish denominations, protested the Boswell Amendment. In
Montgomery, a statement released by the attorney ofminister, Richard Rives, maintained
that local clergymen believed that the Amendment would place arbitrary powers in the
hands of local registrars and that there was no objective way to interpret the proper
understanding of the Constitution.^^ Bishop Thomas J. Toolen of the Catholic Dioceses
ofMobile called the amendment unethical, undemocratic and un-American.^"* Rev. C. C.
Daniel, Montgomery Superintendent for the Methodist Church, insisted that the Boswell
Amendment would “set the state back formany years.”
However, the proponents of black disfranchisement were just as active.
McCorvey concluded that the participation by members of the Democratic Party was
crucial to the ratification of the Amendment. McCorvey petitioned the Democratic
Committee for money to mount what he hoped would be a last campaign to persuade
white Alabamians to vote in favor of the Amendment By his own admission, it was
^ Mobile Press “Folsom WiD Hit Vote Amendment” 3 November 1946.




proper for him to lead a campaign to make the Alabama Democratic Party the “white
man’s party.
Thirty-five voted in favor of the Committee spending $3,500 in a campaign to
encourage Alabama voters to pass the Amendment. Seven members voted against
allocating the fimds and one member failed to cast a vote.^’ With the authorization of
the fimds, McCorvey began a massive effort to “keep the political control of the state in
the well qualified hands ofwhite Alabamians.”
Prior to the vote, everyone agreed that passage of the amendment would make it
impossible for the Afiican American to vote. McCorvey’s campaign focused upon
convincing the voters ofAlabama that only the Boswell Amendment stood between them
and the rising tide of black voters. His demagoguery imdermined much of the progress
made by the NAACP,NWA, and Folsom.
Alabama voters went to the voting booths early on November 6, and by the
afternoon, the outcome favored the proponents of the bill. With returns from 1,264 boxes
of the state’s 2,362 imofficially tabulated votes, the figures on the constitutional change
were 56,780 for ratification of the amendment and 43,118 against it. Of these votes,
Jefferson County, Alabama’s largest and perhaps most racially divided county, favored
the ratification 16,534 to 13,758. However, in other large counties where there was a
mixture ofblack and white leaders opposing this Amendment, the passage ofBoswell did
Davis V. Schnell, 81 F. Supp., 872-81.




not fare as well. For example, with Richard Rives and others opposing the Amendment,
Montgomery, Alabama’s third largest county, voted against ratification of the
Amendment. Similarly, in Mobile, with Catholic leadership and strong black leadership
from both the NAACP and NVVA, Mobile voters opposed the ratification of Boswell.
With 67 out of the 78 voting boxes in Mobile Coimty completed, 3,184 Mobilians had
voted against ratification and 2,715 in favor of the Amendment. Overall, both city and
QA
county residents opposed the Amendment.
By November 8, two-thirds of the state boxes showed that approximately 62,600
voters had cast their vote for ratification of the Amendment and 53,391 against it.** The
gap only widened as the final tabulations were made. By November 9, the voters
demonstrated that they favored the Amendment 80,836 to 69,788.*^ The final coimt was
89,163 to 76,843 in favor of ratification.*^ E. C. Boswell charged that in order to remove
any doubt, the local Boards should be given judicial status to carry out the will of the
people.*^ On November 15, Governor Sparks of Alabama formally announced the
victory to the citizens of Alabama emphasizing that plans should be made statewide to
Of
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Although devastating, it did not take long for LeFlore and Thomas, now co¬
members of several local organizations in Mobile, to agree that the ruling should be
challenged before the state’s highest court. Over the next year LeFlore gathered the
names of all African Americans who had been denied access to voter registration through
Boswell and urged them to file affidavits with the local NAACP.*^ LeFlore’s highly
publicized efforts, eventually led to one of the most divisive issues among black leaders
in Mobile.
After LeFlore’s successful efforts to build a case against the Mobile Board of
Registrars, the Mobile Branch was instructed by the National Branch of the NAACP to
assist the Birmingham Branch in contesting the case in Alabama. Stunned because he
had fully expected the suit to originate in Mobile, LeFlore reluctantly acquiesced to the
request of the national organization. Roy Wilkins, Secretary of the NAACP, believed
that Birmingham had the better chance of winning the case. Birmingham was also the
logical choice.
The National NAACP had plaimed for several years to sue the Mobile and
Birmingham Boards of Registrars for their voting laws through its “Operation Suffrage,”
program. The NAACP had sought to pilot the program in Birmingham. Fighting the
Boswell Amendment in Birmingham was a logical extension to the organization’s earlier
** Affidavit, Ulysses Reed, 20 October 1948; Affidavit, Leon Branch, 21 October 1948; Affidavit,
William Peterson, Undated.
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effort.*^ However, this rationale did not appease blacks in Mobile. Moreover, to the
disappointment of a growing number of black leaders in the city, LeFlore continued to
meet regularly with Mobile blacks to keep them informed on the goals of the national
Branch and collect dues for the state’s Conferences of Branches in support of the
QQ
upcoming legal battle.
By early 1947, the Alabama branches were ready to take their case to court.
However, like the local NAACP, the NWA and Thomas had gathered enough data and
garnered enough support from the black community in Mobile to make their own case
against Boswell. Thus, prior to NAACP filing suit, Hxmter Davis and nine members of
the NVVA filed their own lawsuit against the Board of Registrars ofMobile. LeFlore
maintained:
It so happened that one of our board members, a Mr. J. J. Thomas, who headed
the Voters and Veterans League, had other thoughts about initiating the challenge
against the Boswell Amendment and filed a suit against the Boswell Amendment
within the thirty day period that we had decided that we would institute our court
action.*^
With both cases filed, the Court moved to hear theNWA case on November 3,1948.
“To the Ministers of the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance and the Baptist Ministers
Association” 15 November 1945, LeFlore papers; Dorothy Autry, “NAACP in Alabama,” 230-231;
Stephen F. Lawson, Black Ballots. 94 and 376.
** “To the Ministers of the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance and the Baptist Ministers
Association.”
Mclaurin’s interview with LeFlore and Bolden, Undated.
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A Case for Change: Davis v. Schnell
The case, hereafter referred to as Davis v. Schnell, became the landmark case for
voting rights in modem Alabama. It argued that Afiican Americans’ constitutional right
to vote had been violated by the Mobile Board through the illegal use of the Boswell
Amendment because it required, Afiican Americans to “imderstand and explain” any
articles of the Federal Constitution selected by the local Board.^® The Board of
Registrars, however, based its case on the premises that the legislature had not violated
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments in adopting the Boswell Amendment; that the
citizens of Alabama had not violated fi'anchise rights by ratifying the Amendment; and
that the Board of Registrars had acted judiciously in registering black and white voters.^*
During the trial, members of the Board of Registrars testified that although several of the
plaintiffs, including Himter Davis, Julius B. Cook, and Russell Gaskins had applied to the
board for registration and been rejected, they had been treated fairly.
The trial swung in favor of the NWA when Board member, E.J. Gonzales,
refused to testify in favor of the defendants, maintaining that he could not join in the
denials of the other members.^^ Gonzales did testify on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Gonzales, appointed to the Mobile Board of Registrars by Folsom to monitor the Board’s
treatment of Afiican Americans, was a key witness for the defense. He testified that he
^ Davis V. Schnell, 81 F. Supp., 872-81.
” Ibid, 4.
^ Ibid; John L. LeFlore and Wiley Bolden, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, Undated. McLaruin’s Oral Interview with LeFlore and Bolden,
Undated.
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had personally witnessed members of the Board using a double standard when registering
O'?
black and white voters.
The plaintiffs also used the testimony ofHunter Davis and Julius B. Cook. Both
men testified that they were eligible voters who were denied the right to vote by the
Mobile Board ofRegistrars.^ Evidence revealed that both candidates met the residential
and age requirements stipulated by Section 178 of the Constitution of Alabama. In
addition, they had been gainfully employed for the past twelve months, and were U.S.
citizens of good character. The reason given for the denial of ballots was their failure to
explain the U.S. Constitution to the satisfaction of the Board.’^ Records used by the
defense also revealed conclusively that the Board had a pattern of refusing to register
blacks.
From October of 1947, the time when members of the current Board assumed
office, to March 1, 1948, the filing date of the suit, thirty-nine African Americans were
registered. Prior to March 1, 1948, sixty-five Afiican Americans were registered and
fifty-seven were rejected because, as far as the Board was concerned, they could not
“understand and explain” the Constitution. These same records revealed that only eleven
white voters were rejected and none as a result of the Boswell Amendment.
Finally, the records showed that since the incumbency of the Board over 2,800
whites had been allowed to register and only 104 Afiican Americans. The total
” Davis V. Schnell, 81 F. Supp., 872-81.
95 Ibid.
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population of Mobile was 230,000. Sixty-four percent were white and thirty-six percent
were African American.^^ Thus, the case designed by the NWA turned out to be more
sound than the NAACP or the Mobile Board ofRegistrars had originally believed. Those
who had hoped that these leaders were trying to make something out of nothing were
mistaken. Perhaps the legitimacy of the NWA’s case was confirmed when the National
Conference came to its assistance.
On January 7, 1949, three members of the Mobile federal court ruled that the
Boswell Amendment was unconstitutional because it had been used by the Mobile Board
ofRegistrars to prevent Alabama citizens from registering based on their lack ofability to
read and comprehend the U.S. Constitution. The count concluded that Boswell was a
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The three-judge panel, consisting
of Judge Julian McCord of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and District Judges
Clarence Mullins of Birmingham and John McDuffie of Mobile, ruled that "it clearly
appears that this Amendment was intended to be, and is being used for the purpose of
discriminating against applicants for the franchise on the basis of race and color."’’
Thus for the first time since the implementation of the Democratic Primary, the
voter system, in theoiy, had to treat all votem in Alabama equally. Similar to the pattern
of voting that occurred immediate after the demise of the Democratic Primary, black
communities throughout the state began to experience an upsurge in voter participation
with no end in sight. According to one Birmingham writer, “States Righters have
97 Ibid.
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opposed mass registration and are decidedly against any law which would outlaw the poll
tax. Regardless of these obstacles the Negro voters are on the increase, and there seems
to be no limit to this increase.”^*
By any standard, the victory by NWA was most remarkable. Its reverberations
were felt locally, regionally, and nationally. The NWA set a precedent in the South
while it permanently changed Alabama’s voting laws. Although the fight was far from
over, for all intents and purposes, this ruling cut the legs out from under white
leadership.^ Even more noteworthy was the fact that this case was achieved by
organization and litigation, not through violence, which had marked many of the civil
rights struggles in Alabama. Given the hostility that would erupt throughout the state in
other settings, it is doubtful that this Amendment could have been legislated in other
urban settings in Alabama without mass public confrontation.
Thomas’ ability to organize the black community became the springboard for
much of its success in Mobile. On January 10, 1949, the NWA held a mass meeting at
the Metropolitan A.M.E Church on Davis Avenue. Excited about the reversal of the
Boswell Amendment, several hxmdred African-American Mobilians attended. The tenor
was jubilant, but cautious. Leadership implored the attendees to go out the veiy next day
to register, knowing that the federal court was behind them.*®® The civil rights leader.
The Gulf Informer. “More Potential Negro Voters in Alabama,” 17 June 1950.
^ Glenn Feldman, From Demagogue to Dixiecrat: Horace Wilkinson and the Politics ofRace.
(University ofChicago Press), 1973, 158.
100 Mobile Press. “Colored Assembly Urged to Attempt To Register Here” 10 January 1949.
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Alex Herman declared that “The fighting has just begun. The other side isn’t going to
take this lying down.”**^*
However, with the intention of keeping the momentum, Thomas announced a
southern campaign to raise $25,000 to fight future attempts to disfi'anchise the Afiican-
American voter. Other speakers stressed the importance of African Americans in
Alabama not depending on outside help to gain their rights. This clarion call would
prove to be the “battle cry” for Afiican-American leadership in Mobile throughout the
remaining years of the civil rights movement.’*’^ As expected, the repeal of the Boswell
Amendment caused an immediate stir among states’ rights supporters, both Dixiecrats
and Loyalists. As one supporter suggested, “Once the dam is broken you can’t put the
water back.” These individuals believed that the federal government had overstepped its
boimdaries, usurped the rights of Alabama citizens, and attempted to make blacks and
whites live together as “one big family.” Others believed that the government’s attack
against the state was grounds for the “Suit of black sectionalism, prejudice and
jealousyShocking to many of these conservatives was the reality that they would
have to compete for the black vote in order to effectively challenge the Republican Party,
a move that had begun in the mid-1930s.
In Atlanta and Mobile, blacks were being watched by southern legislators





prove that blacks will try and abuse their voting privileges by voting in blocs.” Although
the number of black voters in Mobile had not yet caught up with Atlanta’s black
community, its increase influenced the outcome of local elections in 1950.’®^
To deal with what most white conservatives understood as anti-white legislation,
white legislators’ leadership began examining ways to get around the repeal of the
Boswell Amendment. Dixiecrat Horace Wilkinson suggested that the Democratic Party
become a private club, divorcing itself from any official state convention. This was
unacceptable to most Democrats. However, what the committee did support was a new
amendment, called Boswell Junior, to circumvent the black vote.
When the court ruled that the Boswell Amendment was illegal, it set forth
additional guidelines to determine voter eligibility. Cohorts of the Boswell Amendment
used this opportunity to create the “Boswell Junior Amendment.” This, too, was defeated
by leadership in Mobile. In an angry protest from black leadership in Mobile, Joe
Langan and several other white senators filibustered this Amendment and it died in the
Senate. Langan maintained:
Of course when this group then file[d] to challenge the Boswell amendment, and
it was declared unconstitutional, then at the next session of the legislature,
legislation was introduced to try to meet the criteria that was set-up in the courts
decision as to why the Boswell amendment was unconstitutional. Well, this
again was directly aimed at keeping black people form voting in Alabama. So, I
finally discussed this matter with the governor who felt that something should be
done to defeat this legislation or not even allow the constitutional amendment to
be presented to the people ... because of its repressive nature. And finally, there
were four or five senators that did agree out of the total senate that we should try
The Gulf Informer. “Colored Votes Significant in Two Elections: Mobile, Atlanta Watched By
Designing Foe,” 14 September 1949.
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to block it. So we did put on a filibuster for a number of days speaking against
this constitutional amendment. And as it was drawing close of the session of the
legislature, we filibustered night and day until the final twelve o’clock midnight
of the final day of the session . . . even though, they castigated us and made all
kind of defamatory remarks about us and everything from a racial standpoint.*^
Efforts to find holes in the Boswell Amendment were made continuously by local
Boards aroimd the state. As chairman of the Board of Registrars in Birmingham, H.A.
Thompson controlled voter registration in the city. First appointed in 1947, Thompson,
who was called “Mr. Gus,” was a seventy-year-old man described by the Birmingham
News as a “strong Dixiecrat plumper.” He served as chairman until 1955; during that
time he fought to prevent what he called the “mass registration of all persons over the age
of 21 years, regardless of the qualifications now required under the laws of the State of
Alabama.”*”^ In his courthouse office by eight every morning, Thompson opposed poll
tax reform and all other democratic measures designed to enlarge the voting pool in
Birmingham, something that he feared “would result in a social and economic calamity in
Alabama.”****
In Mobile, the Board attempted to limit the black vote by slowing down the
registration process. On one occasion, Estella Hicks, a local school teacher, recalled
standing in line “all day” before being turned away. However, with the progress already
in motion, the attempt to slow down the black vote was unsuccessful. Despite the
Board’s efforts, over 1,125 African Americans registered during one voter registration




session. Thus, the number of black voters in Mobile would soon more than double, from
800 to 1,650.'®’
The Dawn of a New Era
Following the success of the NWA, the black community regrouped as LeFlore,
faced the bourgeoning reality of new leadership as well as the rise of new organizations
to fight for Afiican-American political rights. To his dismay, LeFlore was beginning to
fall from favor with many working-class black Mobilians who viewed him as a bourgeois
black representing middle-class values, which were alien to them. He was also charged
with devoting most of his energies to the goals of the national, regional and statewide
organizations at the expense of the local membership.
The crisis peaked with the Boswell Amendment. The NWA became angry with
the local NAACP when LeFlore appealed to the blacks in Mobile to give financial
support to help the Birmingham branch fight the Amendment. The NWA appealed to
LeFlore to align with them in the matter. To their dismay, LeFlore accused the
leadership of theNWA ofpursuing the Boswell Amendment at the cost of the NAACP.
In a letter written to the Ministerial Alliance in 1948, LeFlore objected to how
leaders of the NWA handled the Boswell Amendment. According to LeFlore, the
NAACP had communicated its goals to the community, yet Mobile’s ministers
stampeded into one of their meetings in order to bully the NAACP into giving funds to
their efforts against the Boswell Amendment. He stated:
Mobile Press. 19 January, 1 February 1947.
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Despite a full explanation of NAACP policy on a national and state basis for the
governing of Branches, and all that we might have said pointing out that we have
a similar case in court that we are bound to support, and that we have not publicly
solicited money for any such case, pending a settlement of the question as to
whether the local NAACP would have to file a case here -- in view of the
Birmingham case - our meeting was stampeded by the two or three men who
came to the meeting evidently for the purpose of compelling us to give funds -
regardless of the right or wrong of their petition,***^
Moreover, LeFlore accused these leaders of using the information gathered from these
meetings to prepare their case against the Mobile Board ofRegistrars. Although LeFlore
maintained that his only concern was that a suit be filed against the state for violating the
voting rights of African Americans, and credited Thomas and Voters League for being
responsible for the abolishing of the Boswell Amendment, the relationship between
LeFlore and Thomas became temporarily strained, as did the attitude of blacks in Mobile
with national organizations.^^*
While LeFlore did not openly express his dislike for other local groups, he did
believe that the NAACP had proven itself to be concerned with local issues and deserved
the support of other local organizations. With the emergence of Thomas and the NPLV,
LeFlore’s ability to lead the black community in Mobile was challenged, which
jeopardized the NAACP’s role in the Mobile as well as his own reputation as a leader.
To reverse the mounting hostility against his leadership, LeFlore worked harder
for the rights of local citizens. He became part of the Committee of Nine, which
organized a number of middle- and working-class African Americans to bring about
“To the Ministers of the Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance and the Baptist Ministers
Association” 15 November 1945, LeFlore Pj^ers.
John L. LeFlore, interviewed byMelton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project,
Mobile, Alabama, 9 October 1972.
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social change in the Mobile community. He attacked the Brookley Air Force Base for its
segregation policy, which violated President Truman’s Executive Order #9981. He also
gained the respect of both the unions and local workers by helping them fight
discrimination at the local plants. LeFlore reclaimed much of his prior support and by
1951, was able to replace the organization’s lost membership. More Afiican-American
women also began participating in 1952, as a number of them pledged their power and
support to the NAACP. According to these women.
The time has now come when we must rally to the support to the Agency that can
and does mean so much to our progress as Americans citizens. Half-hearted
efforts will no longer suffice. The Negroes of other cities ... have recognized the
fact that there can be no progress without united striving. The time has come for
the Negro women of Mobile to demonstrate their power and willingness to join
hands with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in
this all-important moment. We Negro women are facing one of the most
important decisions in the history of the Negro’s progress. We are lagging in this
time ofopportunity.”^
On July 26, 1953, a year prior to the Brown v. Board of Education decision,
LeFlore filed petitions to integrate the Mobile Public Schools.”^ Later that year, the
Mobile’s NAACP was honored by the National headquarters with the Outstanding
Achievement Award at the National Convention in St. Louis. By 1954, the local NAACP
exceeded its recruitment goal of 1,157 members by having 1,344 members, which placed
them among the nation’s largest branches.”'*
Letter to Mrs. Sheppard from Miss. Lewis, 13 March 1952, LeFlore Papers.
“BlackAVhite Mobile,” 1990,3.
J. L. LeFlore to Lucille Black, 14 July 1955, LeFlore Papers.
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Through the efforts of the black leadership, particularly the NAACP, the Mobile
movement began flexing its political muscle to integrate its police department during the
early 1950s. During the local elections of 1953 a voting-slip that described the platforms
of candidates seeking public office was circulated by a plethora of leaders, including A.
S. Crishon, C. H. Montgomery, Joseph Lowery, B. B. Williams, John Randolph, Robert
Gilliard and Irene Washington.***
Because of their efforts, Joseph Langan, Charles Hachmeyer, and Henry Luscher,
Sr., who were supported by the black community, were elected to the Mobile County
Board of Commissioners. Their ability to endorse candidates who supported civil rights
worked immediately in favor of the black community. These men set a precedent that
would transform opportunities for blacks in civil service. On their first day in office
these men went before the Mobile County Personnel Board to have all of the restrictions
on blacks in civil service removed.**^
According to Leflore, this move led to a tremendous growth in the number of
opportunities, making it possible for the first time since Reconstruction to hire the first
two black police officers in the state. These men, W. O. Powell and Walter Jackson,
were hired in 1953.**’ The number of black police officers would grow, making Mobile
one of the most progressive cities in the South. However, organizational change in
John L. LeFlore and Wiley Bolden, interviewed byMelton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral
History Project, Mobile, Alabama, Undated.
Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 12 October 1972; Ibid.; McLaurin’s interview with Langan, 1972.
ClarenceWashington, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 9 September 2001;
Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Stoiy ofJohn LeFlore,” Museum ofMobile, 1999.
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Mobile was waiting in the wind. By 1956, Alabama would loose its NAACP branch.
This was a blow to the city since the branch had been the state’s most radical civil rights
organization during the first halfof the twentieth century.
CHAPTER THREE
DEMISE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
COLORED PEOPLE AND RISE OF THE NON-PARTISAN VOTERS LEAGUE,
1956-1963
We will only bow to God Almighty, and not to the false god of race supremacy.
Joseph E. Lowery, Mobile, Alabama, July 10,1956
Introduction
By the mid-1950s, the struggle for civil rights was intensifying throughout the
country. Nationally, civil rights organizations were proving to be formidable opponents
against racial discrimination and the potential of political activism was becoming
particularly threatening to the Jim Crow South. With the Montgomery bus boycott,
Alabama had become the central focus of the civil rights movement and black leaders
throughout the state were organizing grassroots organizations, some radical in nature, to
stand against segregation. These individuals were far more likely to publicly condemn
social inequality. For instance, in 1956, Joseph Lowery had become imequivocal in his
stand against white supremacy. Lowery, former director of education for the Mobile
NAACP, intimated during a civil rights rally in Mobile in 1956 that the allies of civil
rights would not succumb to the falsehood of racism. From the early 1950s to the early
1960s, Lowery worked side-by-side with John LeFlore to desegregate public
accommodations, public education, and civil service in Mobile. His vision and
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determination earned him the resolute backing from Mobile’s black community and
compelled him to help organize Mobile’s Committee of One Hundred, shortly after the
extinction of the NAACP in Alabama.* The Committee of One Hundred’s leadership
was committed to eliminating racial inequality in Mobile. Members of the Committee
believed that failure to attack segregation on every front legitimized the city’s legal
exclusion ofblacks, which prevented them from exercising their ftill citizenship rights.
In 1956, the Committee informed the municipal authorities that the city’s peaceful
race relations that existed in Mobile would be jeopardized if changes were not made in
the city’s segregation policies.^ In June of that year, more than 500 people gathered at
the Tabernacle Baptist Church to hear Lowery and others condemn racial inequality and
segregation.^ According to the Mobile Register, every seat in the comparatively small
auditorium was filled, while numerous spectators lined up along its sides and back.
Others listened intently from the sidewalk in front of the church or stood outside the open
windows.'* The Committee’s radical philosophy had an immediate impact on the civil
rights movement in Mobile. However, more importantly, it paved the way for the
introduction of the Non-Partisan Voters League (NPLV). Most of the Committee’s
leaders, who were also members of the defunct NAACP, helped to organize the NPLV.
* Robert Gilliard, interviewwith author. Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999.
^Ibid.
^ Mobile Press. Equal Rights Demanded at Negro Mass Meeting, 10 June 1956.
^Ibid.
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The NPLV became Mobile’s most formidable civil rights organization after the demise of
the NAACP until its reorganization in 1964.
This chapter will examine the Mobile movement while under the leadership of the
NPLV. It will cover the years 1957 to 1963, six years that brought the nonviolent phase
of the Mobile movement to a climax. Although successful, after 1963, the Mobile
movement expanded its strategy to include public confi-ontation. Similar to the impact
that the black power movement had on the younger generation of African Americans
throughout the nation, its militant philosophy influenced the Mobile movement. By the
early 1960s a growing number of younger and more militant blacks had become
impatient with nonviolence and the American legal system. Many of these individuals
embraced the city’s most popular and militant organization, the Neighborhood
Organized Workers (NOW), which accomplished many of its goals through public
organized protests.^ NOW became one of the most important civil rights organizations in
Alabama after 1964. Others would recast their lot with the reorganized NAACP, whose
leaders would also take a radical stand towards civil rights.
From 1957 through 1963, the NPLV directed the Mobile movement. Founders
included Wiley Bolden, Sherman Smith, Raymond Scott, and Reverend Ed Williams.
Interestingly, the names of other organizers such as John LeFlore and Clarence
Montgomery were initially missing from the League’s records. More than likely, this
was due to Mobile blacks making a deliberate attempt to disassociate from the NAACP
^ Frank P. Thomas, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
4 August 1971.
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until its demise in 1956. LeFlore had reorganized the NAACP in Mobile in the 1920s
and Montgomery was the organization’s president in 1956.^
Other civil rights activists who worked closely with the League included Joseph
Lowery, O. B. Purifoy, Robert Gilliard, A. S. Crishon, and John Randolph. However, the
community-driven NPLV was distinguished from the local NAACP in other ways.
Alabama’s NAACP had been perceived by many African Americans in the state as more
class conscious, concerned more with personal gain than with the social stability of the
black community. Although the Mobile branch had shown itself to be in tune with the
needs of the local populace, its actions were oftentimes amalgamate with the efforts of
other southern branches that endorsed social accommodation and segregation itself at the
expense of their respective communities. Thus, many working-class blacks held the
opinion that the NAACP was led by elitists who were unwilling to risk their privileged
status in the community by opposing the white power structure.
The new grassroots groups that sprang up in Alabama after the demise of the
state’s NAACP were more community conscious. These groups were organized by local
citizens and they were led by local leaders. They worked to change conditions at the
community level. Because they were perceived by the working-class black community
as part of the solution to racism and discrimination, these organizations appealed to the
larger Afiican-American community. In Birmingham, civil rights leader, Fred
Shuttlesworth, insisted that the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights
® Keith Nicholls, “The Non-Partisan Voters League ofMobile, Alabama: Its Founding andMajor
Accomplishments,” GulfCoast Historical Review 8 (Spring, 1993); 82.
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(ACMHR), organized in 1956, would not “carry out the work of the NAACP,” which
had been too passive on the matter of race relations in the city/
Like ACMHR in Birmingham, the NPLV was the core ofblack protests in Mobile
and reflected more working-class values. Its successful campaigns led to the black
community integrating everything from lunch counters and the civil service to public
education. Again, much of the progress came as a result of peaceful protest and
negotiation. As violence shattered race relations in the South, particularly in Alabama,
the NPVL negotiated some of the most impressive achievements of any city in the South.
According to O. B. Purify, the victories of the NPLV were nothing less than awesome.
He stated, “It was truly remarkable that Mobile blacks were able to achieve so many
successes at a time that the enemies of racial justice throughout the South were
attempting to turn back theclock.”*
The League’s most outstanding accomplishments were its successful movements
against black disfranchisement and segregation, the two most racially debilitating forces
in the South since the Civil War. In Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age of
Jim Crow, author Leon F. Litwack writes, “When the white South acted on its racial
creed, it sought to impress on black men and women their political and economic
powerlessness and vulnerability-and most critically, to diminish both their self-esteem
’ Andrew M. Mannis, A Fire You Can’t Put Out: The Fred Shuttlesworth Story (Tuscaloosa:
University ofAlabama, 1999), 16.
* Mobile Press Register. “Purifoy: Racial Division is Saddening,” 12 March 1994; Documentary,
“A Quite Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore, Museum ofMobile.” 1999.
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and their social aspirations.”^ Thus, disfranchisement and segregation depended on each
other. Without tearing the barriers of disfranchisement, the black community diminished
its chances of affecting segregation laws.
Upon its inception, the League took up the cause of voting. Its leadership viewed
the black community’s right to vote as integral to their birthright as citizens, and the
primary means of gaining social and political freedom.*® Under the auspices of the
NPLV, the community’s electorate came of age. By the late 1950s, the African-
American community in Mobile had increased the black vote substantially. Leadership
used well-organized registration drives to rally new voters and by 1958, less than ten
years after the Boswell Amendment, Mobile’s African-American community had
established itselfas a political force in Alabama.
Between 1958 and 1960, the number of registered black voters doubled in Mobile
County. In light of the fact that other black communities in Alabama failed to make
comparable advances, the political movement in Mobile became Alabama’s most distinct.
The maturing political conscious became more evident in 1959 when the NPLV modified
its constitution to establish an office of Director of Casework to make investigations into
civil rights issues and survey the hlack community’s social, political, and economic
issues.
® Leon F. Litwack, Trouble in Mind: Black Southerners in the Age ofJim Crow (New York:
Alfred A. Knoph, 1998), 219.
New By-Laws for Southern Conference for Human Welfare, Undated, Leflore Papers.
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This process established proceedings that ensured the NPLV of its legitimacy as a
bona fide civil rights organization in Mobile.“ Hence, in 1960, Hugh W. Sparrow, staff
writer of the Birmingham News, assessed the black vote in Mobile. According to the
roster of qualified voters issued on April 15, 1958, Mobile County had a total of 57, 869
voters. Of that number, 5,152 were African American. In 1959, the black vote in
Alabama increased to 73,272 from only 6,000 in 1947. However, the state had the lowest
percentage of black voters among all Southeastern states at 8.1 percent compared to
Louisiana with the highest percentage at 13.9 percent. Among the three largest urban
areas in Alabama, black voters in Mobile, at 22.9 percent, more than doubled percentage
ofblack voters in Montgomery at 10.2 percent and Jefferson County at only 9 percent. In
fact, although blacks in Jefferson County outnumbered blacks in Mobile almost three-to-
one, less than 600 votes divided the total ofblack voters in these cities.*^
The Mobile County voting list in April of 1960 included the names of 9,844
African Americans out of a total of 64,869. Although this number might seem
minuscule, it represented a tremendous growth in black political participation in
Alabama. African-American leaders viewed it as the dawn of the city’s political
maturity. The number and proportion of registered voters in the African-American
community were actually greater than those of white Mobilians. Records of the Mobile
” A Guide to the Records of the Non Partisan Voters League, Series Descriptions, Undated.
Voting Education Project, Undated, Southern Regional Council Papers, 1944-1968.
“A Note on Alabama,” 11 May 1959, Southern Regional Council Papers, 1944-1968.
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County Board of Registrars showed that between February 1 and April 15 of 1960, the
number ofwhite voters increased from 54,688 to 55,025.
The list of African-American voters, however, increased by fifteen percent, from
8,826 to 9,844 and showed no signs of slowing down.*'* According to Sparrow, if the
number of Afiican-American voters continued to grow at that rate, nearly 31 percent of
Afiican Americans would be registered by 1960.*^ Sparrow added that the situation in
Mobile County had reached the point where, it was reported, there was "a very definite
rhythm," in the black vote as they [NPLV members] interviewed and approved
candidates that they wanted the black community to support.*^ According to Sparrow, if
the Afiican-American community in Mobile County doubled its registered total by April
15, 1962, it would be a deciding factor, not only in local races but in determining who
would be moving into the governor’s mansion. As one “prominent” resident commented.
Mobile already had several important African Americans on the police force and would
soon, by bloc voting, compel business and municipal employers to open up white-collar





The effort to increase black voting soon acquired a momentum of its own. Robert
Gilliard recalled the work of the African-American community as well as the effort of
Clarence Montgomery, President of the Mobile Coimty Coordinating Committee for
Registration and Voting. He stated:
We were out there beating the bushes and Clarence Montgomery should be
afforded a lot of credit. He talked about the need to vote everywhere he went. He
had a radio program on station WMEZ where he stressed voter registration. He
also took people to vote in his personal vehicle.'*
In 1959, Montgomery was instrumental in staging one of the most organized and
successful mass meetings for African-American voters in the history of Mobile. His
diligence almost single-handedly produced a higher voter turnout for local and state
races, which, in turn, influenced the outcome of several political contests.
By 1960, there were four wards in Mobile that had a majority of black voters.
Ward Ten, the largest and most influential, coimted 2395 African-American voters and
only eighteen white voters; Ward Twenty-two had 835 African-American voters and 608
white voters. Ward Twenty-three had 371 African-American voters and 327 white voters.
Ward Fifteen had 301 African-American voters and twenty-three white voters.'^ These
wards compelled white politicians to support civil rights legislation or risk electoral
” Ibid.
** Robert Gilliard, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999.
” Birmingham News. “Mobile Negro Voters double since 1958,” 4 July 1960.
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defeat. According to Gilliard, it was Ward Ten, led by Alex Herman that determined the
results ofmost municipal contests. Blacks in other voting wards often followed the lead
‘y(\
of the ward, which gave them a substantial political influence in the city.
In addition to its numerical growth, the community’s political maturity advanced
its political standing in the city. Emphasizing the power of the vote, the NPLV educated
the black voter by using the so-called “Pink Slip,” a named derived from the color of
paper used for that particular ballot. The NPLV used the slip to rate the political views of
candidates, especially as they pertained to the black population. NPLV leaders would
invite candidates to appear before a panel and pose questions that were important to the
African-American community. These question-and-answer sessions were followed by
thorough inquiries into the political convictions ofeach candidate.
The candidates’ opinions on issues as mundane as sewage disposal and street
improvement were scrutinized as closely as their positions on major problems such as
housing, police protection, and imemployment. Upon completion of its review, the
^ 1
NPLV would rate each candidate before offering or withholding its endorsement.
Although there were occasional disagreements over the best candidates for the various
offices, this system became indispensable to the African-American community.
The review process provided black voters with the information that they needed to
use their hard-won votes wisely. African Americans in Mobile consistently supported
Robert Gilliard, interview with Author, Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999.
Keith Nicholls, The Non-Partisan Voters League ofMobile, Alabama: Its Founding and Major
Accomplishments,” GulfCoast Historical Review 8 (Spring, 1993), 82.
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the candidates that earned the NPVL’s seal of approval. In addition, white politicians had
no choice but to court the black vote. As the influence of the NPLV grew, so did its
command among white Mobilians. Over time, the Pink Slip became the most important
tool used by the African-American community to select its representatives in city hall.
Although Freeman Pollard, Executive Director of the Voter Education Project in
Mobile, expressed the need for more black professionals in Mobile to be involved in the
registration process, by 1963, he too maintained that the voters campaign in Mobile was
operating at an accelerated pace. According to Pollard:
The Voter Education Project here in Mobile is getting along at a progressive pace.
We are now well along the way ofgetting flmctional education units in every part
of the County. This is evidenced daily by the large number of applicants going to
the voter registration office. Many of the neighborhood unit directors send their
prospects through the central office on Davis Avenue to receive additional
education and to get acquainted with a voucher when personal schedules will not
permit such to be done in the neighborhood units. The number having gone
through our central office as of the month ofOctober is 443.^
Between October and December of 1963, the disproportionate number of black
voters to white voters continued to dwindle as the Mobile County Registration Board
registered 5,464 new voters. Of the total, 4,419 voters were White and 1,046 were
black.^^ Hence, Mobile’s strong leadership and, particularly, voter education programs,
were factors that made Mobile one of the most productive areas of voter registration in
^ Letter from Freeman Pollard, Executive Director to Mr. Wiley A. Banton, Project Director, 5
November 1963, Southern Regional Foundation Papers.
“
County Gets Over 5,000 New Voters, Undated Report, Southern Regional Foundation Papers.
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the South. The NPLV prided itself on a theme that was taking hold of the African-
American community throughout the nation.
Overall, given the anemic condition of the black vote in Alabama prior to 1964,
the political movement by African Americans in Mobile-including the defeat of the
Boswell Amendment in the late 1940s“and the voting campaigns of the late 1950s and
early 1960s resulted in the largest proportion of black voters in Alabama and made the
Mobile movement the state’s first successful political movement during the modem civil
rights movements.
IntegrationWithout Confrontation
The maturing political consciousness in the black community, along with the city
leaders’ desire to maintain racial harmony and economic stability, worked on behalf of
the black community. Public accommodations and the civil service were peacefully
integrated and groundbreaking efforts that led to integrating the city’s public school
system were orchestrated. Hence, with its strong political base, and a mood of racial
conciliation sweeping some cities in the South, by 1960, the NPLV began taking a
remarkable stance against Mobile’s entrenched system of segregation, forging political
and economic advancement in the African-American community.
Under the leadership of the NPLV, for the first time since the civil rights
movement started, the black community would push for full integration. This thrust was
articulated by members of the NPLV:
On behalfof the Rev. W .T. Smith, John L. Finley, the Rev. E. D. Williams, E. G.
Smith, Clinton G. Requer, Roger Thomas, James T. Myers, A.H. Harris, Willie
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Donald, Abe Flanagan, Jesse Davis, Thomas Warmer, Frank L. Barlow and John
L. LeFlore, as well as all other citizens similarly situated, the Honorable Members
of the Board ofCity Commissioners of Mobile, are hereby respectfully petitioned
to open all parks and playgrounds, and all other public facilities, including
building, imder jurisdiction of the City or sustained by funds provided by the said
municipal government... on an equal basis, regardless of race, color or creed ...
We further asked the Board of City Commissioners to give favorable
consideration to the adoption of a public accommodations ordinance, which
would entitle any person equal accommodations, facilities, or services, at any
hotel, motel, inn, or other lodging place; also similar service at any restaurant,
cafeteria, cafe, or lunch counter, and admittance to any theater or other such place
of public entertainment, in propria persona, race, color or creed notwithstanding.^'*
In 1959, blacks began petitioning the city to open its library to African Americans
on an equal basis with whites. Although the NPLV believed that the black community in
Mobile would benefit from having access to a first class-library, more importantly, the
League had strategically planned to use the library as a model for legally desegregating
public accommodations throughout the city. After selecting the participants and agreeing
on the time to enter the doors of the public library, the NPLV informed the city leaders of
their desire to peacefully enter the premises of the library and encouraged them to support
their actions. In what would become a pattern of African Americans integrating public
accommodations in Mobile, several leaders of the NPLV entered the public library with
the support ofWhite city leaders and without confr'ontation.^*
In 1960, the NPLV attacked segregation policies at Montgomery, Alabama
Municipal Airport, pushed fourteen travel and waiting room segregation cases, and
^ Letter from the NPLV to the Honorable Members, Board ofCity Commissioners, 1960, NPVL
Records.
25 Robert Gilliard, interview with Author, Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999.
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established a successful waiting room segregation test case at the Mobile Trailway Bus
Station that resulted in landmark changes in public transportation. From February 21,
1961 to October 1, 1961, several members of the NPLV, including LeFlore and Ernest L.
Keon, conducted travel surveys to uncover cases of discrimination in local and interstate
travel.
The results of these surveys were brought to the attention of the Department of
Justice. Their findings led to milestone legislation in statewide and interstate bus and
railroad travel. The bus terminals at New Orleans, Louisiana, Pensacola, Florida,
Montgomery and Mobile and the Union Terminal Railroad Station at New Orleans, the
railroad passenger’s station at Mobile and the Union Station at Montgomery were opened
“7^
to all interstate passengers on a non-segregated basis.
A more sensitive local issue in Mobile was the use of the 18-hole municipal golf
course. African Americans demanded to play at the park on a desegregated basis. In
1961, a federal judge ruled that African Americans had the right to use the 18-hole
municipal golf course. After some complaints by whites, city leaders considered
temporarily closing the course. Blacks and whites used separate dressing rooms and an
overwhelming number of white golfers signed a petition indicating their wish that the
on
course be kept open.
“ Ibid.
Joseph Langan, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 12 October 1972; Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore,” 1999.
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Joseph Langan, who had been reelected to the Board ofCommissioners, knew the
situation well. According to Langan, one of the first things that he promised to do upon
reentering office was to build a large municipal park and golf course. When it was
opened, blacks used the course against the wishes of a small coterie of whites who
brought their grievance to city hall where the other two commissioners talked about
either closing or selling the golf course. Langan posed the question to the community,
asking if people would rather have blacks using the course or closing it to everyone. The
word came back that 95 percent said they would rather have blacks playing.^*
Along the lines of previous successful initiatives, the NPLV integrated lunch
coimters and restaurants. However, instead of sit-ins which had become the most popular
way of desegregating lunch counters and restaurants. Mobile blacks used discussions.
Until the mid-1960s, this was the most successful vehicle of reform in Mobile. It was not
unusual for city leaders in Mobile to contact black leaders, promising to meet their
demands if they agreed to cancel a public protest. In a letter written to Ernest Aiken in
1961, supervisor of Albright & Wood Drug Company, LeFlore articulates the integration
strategy of the NPLV that served the community well during the early 1960s. According
to LeFlore,
You may be interested to know that we have already been successful in getting
the management of one Mobile restaurant to desegregate his facility and there has
been no loss of business. This was due, we believe, because of the fact there has
been no fanfare or public announcement of the change in policy, and stands as
incontrovertible evidence that a transition in this particular can be made with little
or no note. We had the pleasure of eating in this restaurant several days ago with
no indication ofprejudice. May we call to your attention that despite the fact that
28 Ibid.
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we, above any other group in the community, have consistently opposed lunch
coimter sit-in or sit-down demonstrations for Mobile, were completely ignored in
the calling of the recently held conference with regard to limch counter
desegregation at the Alabama Power Company building. Therefore, we do not
necessarily feel morally bound to subscribe to any decision reached at that
meeting. Moreover, we have not been apprised of the proceedings of the same.
We are not inclined to concur in the said action unless it conforms to what we
believe to be the best interest of the community, to the cause of human dignity
and our democratic ideas.^^
In this instance, like numerous others, the NPLV strategy desegregated numerous public
accommodations in Mobile during the early 1960s, including the Girl Scout Council, the
Young Women's Christian Association, and Mobile's Medical Society. The ultimatum to
peaceful negotiation was protest—often hinted by LeFlore. Gilliard maintained that
whites in Mobile were making concessions to blacks not so much because they were in
favor of equality, but because they were afiaid of the economic losses, disruption of
business and bad publicity that a race riot could cause.^° According to Gilliard,
In 1963 Smith, Montgomery, and LeFlore started talking with city officials about
integrating the lunch counters at Woolworth. Van Ackworth, and Morrisons Cafe.
The Mayor agreed to the recommendation and promised to give protection.
Meetings between them were normally held on Monday at the State Street AME
Zion Church. The plan was that they would go down and sit in these places and
the Mayor would send patrols. There were no incidents because these places had
been notified by the mayor that this was going to happen and that he didn't want
any problems, and that if anyone did [create problems] they were going to be
arrested. The Ku Klux Klan started picketing the Woolworth and the Mayor sent
word that if they didn't leave he was going to put every one of them in jail. This
mayor believed in the law. In 1964 when the Civil Rights Bill was passed he held
a news conference and announced to the public that this was the law and we were
going to enforce it.^*
^ Letter from LeFlore to Ernest Aiken, 2 May 1961, NAACP Papers, 2.
Robert Gilliard, interview with Author, Mobile, Alabama, 19 November 1999.
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The process of integration also carried over into civil service employment as the
NPLV pushed for more black policemen, firemen and the hiring of the state’s first black
bus drivers. They were successful in all three areas. In 1960, Mobile added ten
additional African-American firemen and by 1963 there were two fire stations manned by
twenty-two blacks. In 1961, three African-American policewomen and a County
African-American traffic police officer, the first in the state, were hired. In addition, the
League was responsible for the hiring of several African-American census enumerators.
Yet, the most important symbol of racial equality in employment came with the
breakdown of segregation in public transportation. After mraierous heated exchanges
with city leaders and the bus company that began in the 1940s, John LeFlore, Joseph
Lowery and Professor C. E. Powell demanded that the Mobile City Lines employ drivers
and mechanics. The demand was strategically planned after the bus company raised the
bus fare of bus patrons thirty-three percent. Fifty percent of the patrons were black.
They maintained that the bus company’s failure to employ blacks in the past was
comparable to taxation without representation.^^ Moreover, LeFlore asserted:
We believe that public opinion will lend its moral support to our pleas for job
opportunities and better bus service. There is a strong imdercurrent of
dissatisfaction among people who ride the buses, which has been animated [in]
increased fares and what has been describe as poor bus service, in the realization
“Accomplishments 1960-61,” Undated Report, NPVL Records.
Mobile Beacon. “Civic Groups Urge Local Bus Co. To EmployNegro Drivers,” 19 December
1959.
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that they are not getting any tangible consideration in the matter of employment
or service for the money they spend with the transit company.^
These leaders had also contacted Robert Washington, veteran and the 522"**
African-American United States Marine, to consider applying for the position of bus
driver. Washington was well qualified for such a position, having worked as a bus driver
for the shipyard and as a heavy equipment operator at the Brookley Air Field after
leaving service. The protest made by Mobile’s black leaders convinced the bus company
that it was in the best interest of the City Line to employ blacks. As expected,
Washington was the candidate. After passing the exam and completing his training with
the City Bus Line, Washington was hired, becoming the first African American hired as a
•^c
city bus driver in the state ofAlabama
Washington’s position was unique in that it served as a precursor for integration
in Mobile. One of the most important aspects of being a black bus driver during the Jim
Crow era was that, unlike the segregation that black policemen and firemen experienced,
black bus drivers were more likely to work in an integrated setting. So custom-shattering
was the sight of Washington at the wheel of a city bus that a white child referred to him
as a “nigger bus driver.”^^ Yet, although Washington experienced racial slurs and
working conditions that were sometimes second rate—particularly in use of restrooms—he
admits that he never felt physically threatened as the state’s first black bus driver.
Ibid.
Robert Washington, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 5 July 2001; Shelia Flanagan, “A
Moment in Black History” (Article), Museum ofMobile, 2 June 1996.
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Washington saw his selection as one of the most unique opportunities of any black in the
state and believed that his success as a bus driver would open up avenues for other
blacks.^^ He assumed correctly. With his adroitness as bus driver, over a half-dozen
African-American bus drivers had been hired by 1961, including Percy Jones who was
hired afterWashington.
Another direct attack on segregation was in 1960 when Ramon N. Days, Sr.
became the first black postmaster at Magazine, Alabama, a suburb of Mobile. Days had
worked for the Mobile Post Office where he supervised several whites. He was also a
descendent of Zoomer Levinson, one of twenty survivors of the last slave ship, the
Clotilde, whose cargo was smuggled into Mobile in 1859.^^ To ensure peacefiil
negotiation, black leaders urged, Joseph Langan to set up several interracial committees
to foster communications between the black and white communities. This resulted in
Langan setting up a nine-member Special Advisory Committee assigned to handle day-
to-day racial problems. The white leaders included the president of a bank; the personnel
director of the Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Company; and the director of the
Department of Social Security. Black leaders included Robert Gilliard and Bishop W. M.
Smith, pastor of the Afiican Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.
A twenty-seven member commission was formed to develop general policies on
Robert Washington, interview with author, 5 July 2001.
“Accomplishments 1960-61,” Undated Report, NPVL Records.
Mobile Beacon. “Magazine to Get Negro Postmaster,” 9 January 1960; Mobile Beacon. “Days
Sworn In,” 16 January, 1960.
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racial concerns in the city. LeFlore was appointed to the Housing Board, Robert Philips
was appointed to the Water and Sewer Board, and Dr. Henry Goode was appointed to the
Employment Board. One-third of the members of each committee were African
American, which was proportionate to the black population in Mobile itself'*® The
committees identified problems and proposed solutions.
One area of consensus was the need to create more job opportunities for blacks in
Mobile. LeFlore and Langan solved that problem by inviting the Mobile Gas Company,
Alabama Power Company, and public utility companies to the meetings, where they were
persuaded to open up more job opportunities for black Mobilians. The social and
economic conditions of Afncan Americans in Mobile improved as many of these
businesses began hiring and promoting blacks on a regular basis.'**
Integrating the Mobile County Public School System
The true test of racial progress in the city was integrating public education.
Similar to most southern cities, desegregating education had remained Mobile’s final
stronghold on segregation and racism. Although blacks had successfully tested the
boimdaries of segregation in public accommodation, leadership believed that success in
this area would make racial progress irreversible. Segregation in public education also
challenged the city’s growing ideal of racial harmony. By the early 1960s, racial
^ Robert Gilliard, interview with Author, Mobile, Alabama, 19 November 1999; Joseph Langan,
interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile, Alabama, 12 October 1972;
Joseph Lmigan, interview with Author, Mobile, Alabama, 11 November, 1999; Documentary, “A Quiet
Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore,” 1999.
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violence had become commonplace in Alabama, particularly in the state’s most densely
populated areas.
Mobile remained the model of racial harmony in Alabama. Liberal white leaders
prided themselves on maintaining the “peace.” The Wall Street Journal maintained
that while strife and violence increased in the South, Mobile was a place of racial
harmony. According to Joseph Langan, the violence and race-baiting in Birmingham had
no place in Mobile.'*^
One of the first initiatives by blacks in Alabama to address publicly the inequality
in education in the Afiican-American community, which occurred prior to the actions of
the NPLV in the late 1950s, happened in 1947 when LeFlore, W. L. Bolden, and B. G.
Johnson, addressed white city leaders about the disparity in salary between black and
white high school and college teachers. These leaders filed a seven point civil rights
program with the Mobile County Legislative Delegation. After discussion with Joseph
Langan and other community leaders, the Mobile Coimty Public School System passed
an amendment to make the salaries of black teachers equal to those of their white
colleagues. According to LeFlore,
We presented this petition to the Legislative Delegation in a meeting open to the
public at the old Mobile County Court House building. This petition asked
among other things, for equal education opportunities for blacks at the secondary
level and also at the college level. We also asked for equal teachers’ salaries for
black teachers of Mobile County. It so happened that the Legislative Delegation
questioned us quite closely with regard to equal teachers salaries and in relation
thereto, we also asked for a reduction of the pupil-load of black teachers. Black
teachers at that time had in some instances as much as twice as many students in
Wall Street Journal “Harmony in Mobile: An Alabama City Builds Racial Peace as Strife
Increases Elsewhere” Vol. XLl 11, No. 103,18 July 1963.
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numbers as white teachers. The Legislative Delegation questioned us quite
closely. A copy of the petition was presented to each member of the delegation.
We were able to very truthfully and authentically point out that black teachers
were receiving just a little more than half the salary ofwhite teachers at the same
time they had a much heavier load. I can well remember that Senator Langan had
little to say at that particular meeting. But two days later, he made a public
declaration that he would not vote for another penny’s tax for Mobile Coimty
Public School system until it equalized the salaries ofwhite and black teachers.'*^
By 1949, the salaries of black teachers were more in line with white teachers. Florence
Howard, principal, of Caldwell School, reported to LeFlore that she now earned seven
himdred dollars a year more since the reform.^
Still, as with most southern cities, the drive for equity in public education began
with the Brown decision in 1954. The United States Supreme Court’s pronoimcement that
separate-but-equal was not fact gave black leaders the ammunition they needed to attack
segregation. Several school desegregation cases had been litigated by the early fifties. In
Gains v. Canada (1938) the United States Supreme Court ordered the state ofMissouri to
allow blacks to study law at the state-supported institution. In Sipuel v. Board ofRegents
of the University of Oklahoma (1947) the Supreme Court ruled that Oklahoma must
provide legal education to Ada Lois Sipuel. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950) the Court ruled
that Texas had violated Herman Sweatt’s access to an equal education under the
Fourteenth Amendment. These cases laid the foundation for the 1954 Brown decision
that ruled separate but equal unconstitutional. Mobile’s black leadership regarded the
John L. LeFlore, interviewed by Melton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 9 October 1972.
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Brown decision as the most perfect opportunity to integrate public education and move
into mainstream America/^ This ruling resulted from the joint argument made by the
NAACP on behalf of Kansas, Delaware, South Carolina, Virginia and the District of
Columbia in 1952.
A year after the first Brown decision, the Supreme Court ruled a second case
known as “Brown H.” This decision set directives for the school desegregation process.
Desegregation began shortly thereafter in Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma and
Delaware. However, in most southern states this period saw one of the most reactionary
backlashes since post-Reconstruction. Before 1955, moderate sentiments yielded to the
forces of segregationists. Virginia Senator, Harry F. Byrd, supplied the rallying cry:
“Massive Resistance.” In 1956, 101 southern members of Congress signed a “Southern
Manifesto,” that denounced the Supreme Court’s ruling.'*^
White segregationists rightly feared that the genuine implementation of school
desegregation would chip away at Jim Crow, the institution of Southern life which they
were not willing to give up. After the Brown decision, most southern states and local
governments embarked on ways to fight this ruling. Dixiecrats reacted as expected. In
Mississippi, Governor Hugh White began campaigning for the right to keep schools
segregated. White, under the impression that there was an element in the black
community that wanted race-based education, was shocked when an overwhelming
" Ibid.
^
George B. Tindall, David E. Shi, and Thomas Lee Pearcy, The Essential America (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company), 552.
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number of blacks in Mississippi rejected his platform of voluntary segregation in public
education. In an attempt to circumvent the Court’s decision, white convened a special
session of the legislature to draft a bill that would abolish public education and create a
private school system that would be supported by public funds."*^
As in Mississippi, the majority leadership in Georgia followed the same line of
reasoning. In December 1953, the Georgia legislature created a commission for the sole
purpose of finding ways to continue segregated education. In an effort to avoid obeying
the Court’s ruling, the legislature encouraged the citizens of Georgia to vote for
Amendment Four, designed to keep education segregated. If ratified, the amendment
would authorize Georgia’s legislature to provide money and other aid to schools that
remained segregated. In addition to encouraging white voters to support this legislation,
advocates sought to keep public schools segregated by harassing anyone who opposed
them.'** Leaders in Charlotte, North Carolina, and Greensboro, North Carolina, drafted
similar acts of legislation.
One of Alabama’s most ardent Dixiecrats was State Representative Sam
Englehardt, a “diehard” segregationist fi'om a county that was seventy-two percent black,
who insisted that he was not a racist. Englehardt spoke candidly about the desirability of
eliminating the public school system in Alabama. His initial plan was to create a voucher
system in which private schools would be supported by public funding. If imsuccessful.
Mobile Press. “Governor calls for Special Session,” 31 July 1954, 1, b.
^
Henry Allen Bullock, The History ofNegro Education in the South: From 1619 to the Present
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Englehardt planned to create a “voluntary” placement system where students would be
tested before being assigned to a local school. Clearly racist in nature, Englehardt
suggested that each school district be given the authority to test its students. Students’
educational backgrounds would determine whether their new school assignments would
promote longstanding relationships or put students in hostile environments. If all else
failed, Englehardt was prepared to resubmit a bill that would eliminate outright public
education in Alabama, a bill that had suffered defeat the previous year.'^^ For people like
Englehardt, desegregating public schools was a threat that spilled beyond the walls of the
classroom and into halls ofpublic life.
In the wake of the Brown decision, African Americans seemed content to wait for
the unfolding of national legislation to enforce the Supreme Court’s ruling. In Mobile,
Joseph Lowery was the secretary of the NAACP’s committee on education, and a vocal
proponent of civil rights since the early 1950s. His preferred strategy for promoting
school integration took the form of letter-writing to policymakers. These letters expressed
the importance ofMobile to obey the high court’s ruling. He and LeFlore also presented
desegregation petitions that showed the strength of the black community’s public
sentiment in favor of integration to the Board of Education. For instance, Lowery and
LeFlore presented the following excerpt in a letter to Mobile Coxinty Board of School
Commissioners:
The attached petitions respectfully asked the Mobile County School Board to
comply forthwith with the United States Supreme Coxirt decision declaring
Mobile Press Register. “Further Proposal to Skirt Rulings on Schools Given,” 11 July 1954, 6-
Al.
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segregation based on race unconstitutional in our public school system. These
petitions are being filed on behalfof a number ofparents of children of school age
entitled to attend or who are attending Mobile county public elementary and
secondary high schools. They are being submitted to the honorable members of
the school board in conformity to the Wghest ideal of our nation respecting the
equality of mankind. Just as white and black boys have fought, bled and died
together on far-away battlefields to protect our democratic way of life, we can live
together at home in peace and harmony without segregation ifwe are willing to
adhere to Christian precepts and observe the golden rule -with malice toward
none.'”
As the 1950s progressed, blacks continued to improve educational institutions in
their community. At the same time, black educators such as Wayman R.F. Grant,
Principal of Booker T. Washington Junior High School, advanced professionally in the
field of education. During the late 1950s, Grant was selected as a member of the
Committee of Tenure and Academic Freedom of the National Education Association.
Grant had been active in the National Education Association (NEA) since 1950 when he
was the only Afiican American in attendance at the NEA’s Southeastern Conference of
the Department of Elementary Principals.'* In addition, one of the most successful
schools in the South prior to integration was Mobile’s all-black Josephine Allen School.
In 1959, over 700 students were enrolled and approximately 212 students graduated from
the twelfth grade, a high figure for any school in Alabama.
^ C. H. Montgomery, President, T.E. Williams, Chairman ofExecutive Committee, J.L. LeFlore,
Executive Secretary, J. Echols Lowery, Chairman ofEducation Board to the Mobile County School Board
ofCommissioners, 26 July 1955, NPLV Records.
Mobile Beacon. “Mobile Principal Chosen for National Office,” 13 June 1989, 2.
Mobile Beacon. “Rev. C.A. Tunstall Leader ofProsperous Josephine Allen School,” 27 June
1959,4.
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By the early 1960s, new forces began to erode the intransigent opposition to
desegregation and to push the recalcitrant South toward greater compliance with the law
of the land. In other words, these forces had come to imderstand the economic cost of
following an inflexible system of Jim Crow. Numan Bartley, in his excellent study of
massive resistance, has argued persuasively that when this reactionaiy doctrine was
carried to its logical extreme with the closing ofpublic schools in Virginia and Arkansas,
Southerners were forced for the first time to face the dilemma of clinging to an archaic
social system at the cost of regional economic progress and growth. The closing of the
schools to prevent court-ordered desegregation, Bartley declared, represented a “policy of
calculated anarchy,” and it not only “assaulted public education” but it also “threatened
the whole structure of southern society, the region’s economic future and the vested
interests of southern institutions.” Thus, when reason prevailed, conservative and
moderate white leaders recognized the folly of defending segregation and began shifting
their support toward a grudging acceptance of desegregation.”^^ Although there were
sporadic episodes of violence in Alabama during this period, Bartley’s perspective on the
situation in Mobile schools could not have been more accurate.
As the national goals for integration became more ambitious, those of the NPLV
followed suit. Leaders of this organization worked with white city leaders to form ad hoc
boards of whites and blacks to deal with Mobile’s racial problems and social inequities.
Along these lines, in 1959 they invited Martin Luther King, Jr. to the Port City, his only
” Numan Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 193.
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public appearance in Mobile. On Friday January 2, 1959, more than 2000 African
Americans packed the ILA Auditorium to hear Martin Luther King speak at Mobile’s
annual Emancipation Day Celebration. King talked about the dangers of Jim Crow and
suggested ways for African Americans to destroy it. His words would linger within the
community as blacks rededicated themselves to breaking down the barriers of Jim Crow,
especially in the school system.^'* With the national tide turning in favor of
desegregation, the NPLV decided that the time had come to desegregate public education.
One of the most publicized attempts to attack Jim Crow in the schools ofMobile
occurred in 1960 when the NPLV and the Citizens’ Committee denounced the Mobile
County School Board’s refusal to ease the terrible overcrowding conditions of the
Caldwell School. Instead of using the empty Raphael Semmes School to accommodate
the overflow of students, the Board sold the property. The NPLV decried the decision of
the Board as “a serious injustice to the cause ofpublic education, and an affront, based on
spurious grounds, to a large segment of the city’s population and was an obvious
disregard for thousands of children who are compelled to attend class under such
conditions.”^®
This case was a telling reminder to the black community that the “separate but
equal” doctrine would never provide Mobile’s black children with the education that they
deserved. The situation at Raphael Semmes School quickly became the rallying call for
^ Mobile Press. “Negro Leader Advocates Policy ofNonbittemess,” 2 January 1959.
“ Letter from A.S. Crishon and J.L. LeFlore to the Honorable Board ofSchool Commissioners, 13
September 1960, NPLV Records.
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blacks to take legal action against the Mobile County School Board.^^ Less than two
weeks later, president of the NPLV deplored the fact that the Mobile County Board of
School Commissioners had not taken more progressive action to deal with school
segregation and the negative impact of segregated schools in Mobile. According to
Mobile civil rights leader, A.S. Crishon,
We implore the Mobile County School Board study public school programs of
other states, counties, and cities, such as those adopted for Schenectady, N.Y.,
Joplin, Mo., and other places with what may be generally regarded as progressive
education plans, with an open-minded perspective of the improvement of our
school system. We deplore the fact that the Mobile County School Board issued
separate official books for white and Negro schools for the 1960-61 school year.
We believe that any difference predicated upon race, color or religion is
discriminatory and in violation of the law of the land. The Constitution
recognizes no color line in this particular. We respectfully ask that Mobile
County School Board to consider the appointment or selection of a committee of
qualified citizens and educators to study the school problems in our midst, and
make recommendations to the Board consistent with its findings.^’
Eventually, the NPLV would file over 200 lawsuits against the segregation of the
city’s schools. In April, 1961, John LeFlore wrote Thurgood Marshall informing him
that the Mobile NPLV was going to file a desegregation law suit against the Mobile
County School Board. He also requested that assistance be provided through the NAACP
Defense and Educational Funds. The efforts of the NPLV unfolded in what became





The litigation entitled Birdie May Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, signaled the beginning of the end of segregation in public education in
Mobile. John LeFlore had known Davis since she was twelve-years-old and believed that
he could guide her through the process. After persuading Birdie Mae and her parents of
the significance of integration, the NPLV prepared to push their case. The lawsuit went
through the preliminary stages in 1962.
On January 30, 1963, Mae Womie Bolton, John Jones, Lloyd Morris, and Lavem
Ruffin, who attended St. Elmo High, an all-black school seventeen miles from their
homes, attempted to register at Baker High, an all-white school four miles from their
homes. According to Crawford H. Bums, Superintendent of the County School System,
the students were denied admission to Baker, not because of race but due to
overcrowding. In April of 1963, the case was represented in federal court. Attorneys
for the plaintiffs included Jack Greenberg, Constance Baker Motley and Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., of the NAACP and local attorneys, Vernon Crawford and Clarence Moses. The
court’s initial ruling gave blacks in Mobile permission to enter Murphy High. However,
the ruling forbade the integration of elementary and middle schools. Dissatisfied with the
ruling, the NPLV filed several more lawsuits against the Board.^^
To the even greater displeasure of the Board, the NPLV recommended that black
students transfer en masse to white schools. Black leaders called for “a prompt and
BirdieMae Davis v BoardofSchool Commissioners ofMobile County, 1963.
” John L. LeFlore to Constance Baker Motley, 11 February 1963, John L. LeFlore to Constance
BakerMotley, 11 July 1963, NPLV Papers.
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reasonable start” toward integration and the elimination of all racial barriers to education
within 60 days. They also threatened to take their protest into the streets. Mayor
Charles Trimmier was incensed at the demand and requested that a federal and state
investigation be conducted on LeFlore for making threats. Trimmier admonished: “They
do not ask; they demand that I comply meekly in 60 days - or else! Else what? Is John
LeFlore threatening an influx of outside agitators to force these issues?”^*
The sworn enemies of integration in Alabama, led by Governor Wallace, included
his administration, most state legislators and local officials. Wallace warned Alabamians
that the burden of the accumulated lawsuits against segregation would break the state
financially and strike a blow against the liberty and freedom, which, in his words, most
whites wanted.^^ Along with Mobile, black communities around the state were lobbying
Wallace to support the integration ofpublic schools. With the fall session approaching in
1963, Wallace became more determined to preserve segregation in Alabama’s public
school system. Given the fact that he had already lost his battle to keep segregation at the
University of Alabama, Wallace used a variety of strategies to win this battle. In addition
to using fear tactics, Wallace, like the governor of Mississippi, ordered all Alabama
public schools to remain closed when the fall term began.
The declaration by Wallace caused the black community in Alabama great
“ibid.
Mobile Register. “Probe ofLeFlore Sought after Integration Threat,” 17 August 1963.
“ Mobile Register. “U.S. Demands Integration ofMobile Public Schools: Wallace Calls Move
Blackmail,” 19 January 1963,22.
129
concern. Loved by most Whites in Alabama, Wallace was a foe that few blacks believed
they had the public support to defeat. Several cities, including Birmingham, obeyed the
governor’s order. Mobile, however, refused to follow the governor's instructions and
NPLV’s plan to desegregate public schools remained unchanged.®^ When Wallace
learned ofMobile’s intentions, he summoned the AlabamaNational Guard, and 134 state
troopers to prevent Henry Hobdy and Dorothy Davis from enrolling at Murphy High
School.^
However, not to be stymied by Wallace, attorneys for Hobdy and Davis filed an
immediate injxmction against tiie governor’s course of action, which led the U.S. District
Court and Judge Daniel H. Thomas to issue a temporary restraining order against
Wallace.^^ Also, to the governor’s chagrin. President John F. Kennedy federalized the
Guard and ordered them back to their units; a move that was applauded by most
Mobilians.
Although some segregationists in Mobile persisted in opposing integration in
public education, by 1963 many of the citizens of Mobile, both black and white, began
working together to integrate schools. White leaders in Mobile showed a refreshing
willingness to obey federal law. Although John Langan had led the voice of reason in
the face of federal mandates, other leaders began stepping up. According to Gilliard,
"when Wallace sent his troops to Mobile, Sheriff Ray Bridges sent officers to the tell
“ Mobile Press. “Mississippi Coast Also Target of Suit,” 19 January 1963,22.
^ Mobile Press. “Registration Is Peacelul For 2 Negroes ToMurphy,” 4 September 1963,1.
65 Ibid.
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Wallace and the National Guard that he was in charge of policing his own city.”^
Bridges did his part to promote racial diversity when he confirmed the appointment of
George Morris, a 27-year old African-American war veteran, as a regular duty officer on
his staff of law enforcement officers in 1960. He also praised the black community for
working closely with his department and personally arrested several white students for
picketing the school prior to the admission of African Americans.
In addition to Bridges, help came from the Alabamians Behind Local Education
(ABLE), a group of white parents. In 1963, shortly after George Wallace stood in the
doors at the University of Alabama to prevent Letha Ann Surgeon and Vivian Malone
from entering, these parents met in the auditorium at the Azalea Road Junior High School
to ensure that local schools would remain open and that the desegregation process would
go peacefully.
President Hollis Wiseman, a pediatrician’s wife, made it clear that the group was
not interested in debating the relative merits of segregation or desegregation, but believed
that each person had an individual responsibility to stand on the side of law, order and
public school. Langan promised the members of ABLE that the three commissioners
were behind their efforts.^ Although protests continued, the admission process went
“ Ibid., Robert Gilliard, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999.
Robert Gilliard, interview with author. Mobile, Alabama, 19 Nov 1999; Mobile Beacon.
“SheriffConfirms Appointment ofDeputy,” 3 September 1960,2.
“ Wall Street Journal. “An Alabama City Builds Racial Peace as Strife Increases Elsewhere,” 18
July 1963 VOL XLIII No. 193.
69 Ibid.
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smoothly for Hobdy and Davis as they became the first African Americans in the state to
attend high school classes with white students/®
Interestingly, Wallace made no attempts to prevent several students in Huntsville
from enrolling in both elementary and junior high schools. Wallace would take his
reasons to the grave, but may have been less interested in the Huntsville area because it
was relatively small and inconsequential. Integration in the major urban settings such as
Birmingham, Montgomery and Mobile posed a much greater threat to segregation in
Alabama.
Personal motivations might have figured into Wallace’s dream of stopping the
movement in Mobile. However, again, he would challenge LeFlore, and again LeFlore
and other African-American leadership in Mobile would win. The integration of
Mobile’s schools would have been more humiliating to the Wallace administration
because Mobile represented the largest public school district in the state. Nevertheless,
the triumph in 1963 led to other turning points in public education around the state.
Integrating the local public school system became one of the crowning moments of
achievement for blacks inMobile prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Thus, the NPLV evolved into one of the most effective civil rights organizations
in Alabama. In addition to its successfully desegregating public accommodations,
pressuring the city to hire black bus drivers and making inroads in the politics of voting,
it attacked the Mobile Shipyard before the President’s Committee on Government
Contracts and won equal opportunities for African-American workers. It also instituted a
™ Mobile Press. “Registration Is Peaceful for 2 Negroes To Murphy,” 3 September 1963,
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similar case against the Shipyard at Pascagoula, Mississippi, which held over
$86,000,000 in government contracts/*
In 1961 alone, it submitted eight civil rights cases of police brutality to the
Department of Justice and throughout its existence it attacked the criminal justice system
because of discriminatory practices. One of the most widely publicized battles was the
Willie Seals Case. Seals, a native of nearby Prichard, was convicted by an all-white jury
of raping a white woman and sentenced to die in 1961. The NPLV raised over $11,000
to fight the sentence; initially Seals’ death sentence was overturned. Finally, in 1970,
following a third trial, Seals was exonerated. The publicity surrounding the Seals case
brought national attention to the NPLV and an offer of assistance from Martin Luther
King. Although Mobile’s NPLV did not receive the national attention of
Shuttlesworth’s ARMAC or the SCLC, its achievements in Alabama were unmatched.
Massive voter registration campaigns brought thousands of African Americans
into the political process, and during the early seventies it challenged the constitutionality
ofMobile's form ofmunicipal government, designed to eliminate a bloc vote in the black
community.^'* Like the NAACP, the League worked through the legal system to effect
change. In “Spotlight on Alabama”, an editorial printed in the Mobile Register. Sheila
” Ibid.
^ Supreme Court Ruling: Martin J. Wiman v. Willie Seals, Jr., 372- U.S. 915 (1963).
” John L. LeFIore to Whom it May Concern, 25 April 1963, John L. LeFlore to Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., NPLV Records.
John L. LeFlore, interviewed byMelton McLaurin, in McLaurin’s Oral History Project, Mobile,
Alabama, 7 August 1970.
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Flanagan highlighted the fact that “the use of petitions and the courts became the
hallmark of the Non-Partisan Voters League."^^
The NPLV was no less adept with the new wave of protests taking place in the
South during the early 1960s and its leaders prepared the black community for the more
militant phase of the civil rights movement. Perhaps the success of the NPLV’s voting
and desegregation agenda are best summed up by the words of local civil rights leader
John Randolph, a member of the NPLV and instrumental in the Days appointment.
According to Randolph, “As we traveled around the state, people would envy us and
praise us for our work. They wanted to know how we were able to achieve such success
in civil rights.”^^
This was particularly true in breaking down the barriers of Jim Crow. Although
by the end of 1963 Mobile was by no means a fully integrated city, it had made
remarkable strides imder the leadership of the NPLV. Judge Daniel H. Thomas who
presided over an integration ruling in Mobile observed, “Mobile was the most integrated
city in the Deep South.”^’
Mobile Press. “Non-Partisan Voters LeagueWorked for Justice,” 14 February 1993, 5C.
Documentary, “A Quiet Revolution: The Story ofJohn LeFlore,” 1999.
^Mobile Press. "27 Signers On Petition Asking Plan,” 16 January 1963.
CONCLUSION
The years 1942 to 1963 were critical to the social progress of African-Americans
in Mobile. The community distinguished itself in the political arena. It successfully
repealed discriminatory voting rights legislation and activities such as the Alabama
Democratic Primary and the Boswell Amendment, which combined, had disfranchised
Blacks in Alabama since the early 1900s. Thus, organized efforts in Mobile began as a
political movement. To the extent the civil rights movement rested upon collective
action, a sociopolitical activism, particularly through its electoral process had a direct
impact on legislation. Simply, without actively participating in the voting process a
group stands little chance of translating their preferences into public policy. In Blacks
and American Government: Politics. Policy and Social Change authors J. Owens Smith,
Mitchell F. Rice, and Woodrow Jones, Jr., contend that no group has been able to gain
middle class status without the help of the national government adopting legislation to
assist them and that it has been through the electoral process that such legislation is
influenced.* Likewise, blacks in Mobile relied heavily on the electoral process to change
their social status. During the modem movement. Mobile blacks influenced local and
regional legislation in hopes ofprocuring social equality.
The community distinguished itself in education. Blacks desegregated Alabama’s
oldest institution of higher learning. Spring Hill College, in 1954; led one of the most
’ J. Owens Smith, Mitchell F. Rice, and Woodrow Jones, Jr., Blacks and American Government:
Politics. Policy and Social Change (Dubuque. Iowa: Kendall/Hall Publishing Company, 1985), 59.
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organized efforts to desegregate secondary and postsecondary public education in
Alabama; and were successful in forcing the Alabama Board ofEducation to address the
growing vocational needs of Blacks living in southwestern Alabama after World War H.
Aftican Americans in Mobile accomplished great strides in the area of economics. One
of the community’s most outstanding accomplishments of the civil rights movement was
equalizing teacher pay for all educators in Mobile County in 1947. Blacks also
participated successfully in unionized labor, challenged local and statewide legislation
that contradicted federal statues, and desegregated the county, city, and state civil service
systems. Mobile became the first city in Alabama to hire Afiican-American policemen,
firemen, and city bus drivers and served as the paradigm for social change for the state
fi'om the early 1940s to the early 1960s. John L. LeFlore became the state’s most active
civil rights leaders of the first half of the twentieth century and the local NAACP and
several of the community’s grassroots organizations were among the state’s most
successful coordinated efforts.
The account of blacks in Mobile gaining civil rights is connected with the city’s
early history. Located on the Gulf Coast of Alabama, Mobile was one of only a few
southern cities with a commercial economy during antebellum Alabama; it was home of
approximately half of Alabama fi'ee blacks during slavery, and it was the state’s most
culturally diverse community throughout the 1800s. Mobile remained a relatively small,
but culturally diverse southern town for most of the early twentieth century. However,
with the onset of jobs emanating fi-om World War 13, its population nearly doubled to
over 200,000 during the early 1940s. Almost one-third of this population was Aftican
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American. This new populace brought an immediate change to Mobile’s social
landscape. Although there were several incidents of violence recorded during the early
1940s, including the killing of Private Henry Williams and the riot at the state docks, the
historical record of the city shows that from 1942 to 1963, Mobile’s black community
gained civil rights faster and more peacefiilly than most African Americans in the South,
particularly in Alabama.
Challenging the notion that only cities with large-scale demonstrations and often
violent altercations participated in a civil rights struggle, the evidence presented in this
study clearly shows that Mobile had a sustained and vibrant civil rights movement. In
Collective Behavior and Social Movements, the authors point out that a social movement
has three identifying characteristics. It is institutional, well-plaimed and prolonged. The
events of the black community in Mobile meet those criteria. Their actions were
institutional. For instance, the Mobile movement drew heavily on established cultural
guidelines. Leadership utilized press conferences, chapter meetings, petition drives, and
even sit-ins, which led to the peaceful desegregation in public accommodations. Next,
the actions of the black community involved careful planning. The planned bus boycott
in 1942 demonstrates the black community’s ability to strategize successfully. The
organizers produced and distributed literature according to a planned schedule and they
also planned press meetings, conferences, and demonstrations. Thus, leadership’s ability
to map out a potential boycott led to one of the community’s most important negotiation
processes and ultimately set the stage for its modem black freedom stmggle. Finally, the
actions of the black community were durable. Longevity signifies that successful
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movements often last for years and even decades. The public protest for civil rights in
Mobile began in the early 1940s and by 1963, the movement had become one of the most
well-organized efforts in the state. ^
Similar to other movements, African Americans welcomed national efforts but
often found their struggle and their strength to overcome in the trenches of the local
community. It was the NAACP and grassroots organizations such as theNWL, NVPL,
and the Committee ofOne Hundred that set the wheels of change in motion in Mobile. In
“Organized Labor,” historian Bruce Nelson maintains that the relationship between the
NAACP and the local CIO in Mobile accelerated voter registration and other civil rights
activities in the city. Thus, national policy favoring the black community came as a
result of black protest. Moreover, the new laws passed by Congress rarely translated into
immediate local and regional compliance. For example, the 1944 Allright decision, which
abolished the Democratic Primary in Texas, did not abolish the Democratic Primary in
Alabama. Through the efforts of local organizations, the Alabama Democratic Primary
was abolished 1946. Ironically, the inimical Boswell Amendment followed the 1946
defeat of the Democratic Primary, and, again grassroots organizations led the way in
defeating the Amendment. The result of this study, as well as other community studies
suggests that local organizers and participants deserved most of the credit for social
change in the South and in Alabama during civil rights era. To this extent. Mobile’s
^
Gary T. Marx and Douglas McAdam, Collective Behavior and Social Movements: Process and
Structure (New York, Pearson Education, 1993), 72.
^ Bruce Nelson, “Organized Labor and the Struggle for Black Equality in Mobile during World
War II,” The Journal ofAmerican History (December 1993), 960.
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struggle for civil rights reflects the actions and goals ofmost other movements that took
place in the South.
However, what separates it jfrom most of movements in Alabama was that its
protest did not encounter the standard pattern ofviolence that was pervasive in most other
Alabama cities. Black leadership’s ability to organize the African-American community
for political action and liberal white leadership’s desire to maintain social order led to
successful and often peaceful negotiations in economics, desegregating public
accommodations, and eventually public education. Hence, the ability to negotiate with
success in Mobile, and in other southern cities including Dallas, Texas; Charlotte, North
Carolina; and Nashville, Tennessee; clearly show that the civil rights movement had
legitimacy in areas that did not produce mass demonstrations and violence. It is also a
reason why these cities should be more than a footnote to the more publicized
movements.
Finally, to date, no scholar has conducted a comprehensive community study on
blacks in Mobile during the most important era of its modem existence. There are no
research efforts comparable to Glenn Eskew’s study of Birmingham, Robert Norrell’s
examination of the local community in Tuskegee, William Chafe’s research about the sit-
in movement in Greensboro, North Carolina, John Dittmer and Robert Pratt’s description
of the Mississippi movement, or the various efforts on the Montgomery movement.
Moreover, only recently have a few scholars written about the Afiican-American
community in Mobile and the civil rights movement in the same “breath.” This study
seeks to correct both historical oversights. Although much can be gained by examining a
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dramatic moment, event, organization, or person in a single movement, the dynamism of
social change can be investigated only by following the stages through which a
community can arrive at a point in crisis.^ Mostly scattered descriptions and limited
personal interviews, the day-to-day interactions of the African-American community and
its historical significance to helping shape race relations in the state have been all but lost.
Without their voice, the strength and appeal of the movement remains incomplete.
On a more personal note, in the spring of 1986,1 received one of three internships
to work with the Alabama state legislature to learn the practical applications of Alabama
law. During this occasion, I worked with Tom Drake, then the state’s Speaker of the
House of Representatives. I recall Drake as a very courageous, fair, and honest man.
The internship turned out to be more than I had initially intended as Representative Drake
hired me to work with his staff for the remainder of his office. As I give my final
reflections on the Mobile movement, I am reminded of the few short, but memorable
conversations that I had with then governor George C. Wallace. Although I would have
met the governor on occasion, the chances to be in his presence improved tremendously
because of the governor’s close relationship with Representative Drake. In the spring of
1986, the governor was a feeble man with a seemingly childlike passion for simple
conversation. On occasion, he would whisper the words, “keep up the good work.” I
would return the sentiments with, “I’ll try my best, sir, along,” with “how are you doing
William Chafe, Civil Liberties and Civil Rights: Greensboro. North Carolina, and the Black
Struggle for Freedom (New Yoric: Oxford University Press, 1980) 2.
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today?” The state house and the person who sat as governor in 1986, seemed far
removed from the racial climate that had existed in the 1940s, 50s, and 60s.
Hence, race relations have improved remarkably since that time. The public
expressions of the racial unrest in Birmingham, Selma, and Montgomery serve as painful
reminders of Alabama’s past. However, it would be remiss to ignore the current
struggles that Alabamians face in meeting the challenges of increased demographic
diversity. An improved public education system, the growing need to diversify its
economy, modem tax laws, and healthier race relations are by products of the state’s new
growth. Yet, as one continues to reflect on the civil rights movement of yesterday and
today, it is hoped that the Mobile movement will serve as a model for contemporary civil
rights efforts. Leflore’s unfailing faith in the ability of human beings to solve their
problems through reason and negotiation rather than by violence remains an important
alternative in navigating individual and social differences to logical conclusions. It is
also hoped that the Mobile movement will help complete the story of the civil rights
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